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Abstract
We consider a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field games with a major agent
and considerable heterogeneous minor agents in the presence of mean-field interactions. The
individual admissible controls are constrained in closed convex subsets Γk of R
m. The de-
centralized strategies for individual agents and consistency condition system are represented
in an unified manner through a class of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential
equations involving projection operators on Γk. The well-posedness of consistency system is
established in both the local and global cases by the contraction mapping and discounting
method respectively. Related ε−Nash equilibrium property is also verified.
Key words: ε-Nash equilibrium, Forward-backward stochastic differential equation, Input
constraint, Projection operator, Linear-quadratic mixed mean-field games.
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1 Introduction
Mean-field games (MFGs) for stochastic large-population systems have been well-studied because
of their wide applications in various fields, such as economics, engineering, social sciences, and
operational research. Large-population systems are distinguished by a large number of agents
(or players), such that the individual influence of any single agent on the overall population is
negligible, but the effects of their statistical behaviors cannot be ignored at the population scale.
Mathematically, all agents are weakly-coupled in their dynamics or cost functionals through the
state-average (in a linear state case) or the general empirical measure (in a nonlinear state case),
which characterizes the statistical effect generated by the population from a macroscopic per-
spective. Because of these features, when the number of agents is sufficiently high, complicated
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coupling features arise and it is unrealistic for a given agent to obtain all other agents’ infor-
mation. Consequently, for an agent to design centralized strategies based on the information of
all peers in a large-population system is intractable. Alternatively, one reasonable and practical
direction is to transform a high-dimensional and weakly-coupled problem to a low-dimensional
and decoupled one, thus the complexity in both analysis and computation can be reduced. For
this purpose, one method is to investigate relevant decentralized strategies based only on local
information: that is, the relevant strategies are designed only upon the individual state of the
given agent, together with some mass-effect quantities, which are computed off-line.
In this context, motivated by the theory of the propagation of chaos, Lasry and Lions
[30, 31, 32] proposed distributed closed-loop strategies for each agent to solve the limiting prob-
lem, which were formulated as a coupled nonlinear forward-backward system consisting of a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and a Fokker-Planck equation. Moreover, the limiting
problem enabled the design of approximate Nash equilibrium strategies. Independently, Caines,
Huang and Malhame´ [28] developed a similar program called the Nash certainty equivalence
(NCE) principle, which was motivated by the analysis of large communications networks. In
principle, the MFGs procedure consists of the following four main steps (see [5, 13, 25, 27, 32]):
(1) A limiting mass-effect term is introduced, which comes from the asymptotic mass-effect
behavior when the agent number N tends to infinity. This limiting term should be treated
as an exogenous and undetermined “frozen” term at this moment; (2) Through replacing the
mass-effect term with the frozen limiting term, related limiting optimization problem can be
introduced. Thus, the initial highly-coupled problem can be decoupled and only parameter-
ized by this generic frozen limit. Subsequently, using standard control techniques (see [44]),
an HJB equation can be obtained because of the dynamic programming principle (DPP), or
a Hamiltonian system can be obtained because of the stochastic maximum principle (SMP);
the obtained equations can characterize the decentralized optimal strategies; (3) A consistency
condition is established to guarantee that the set of decentralized optimal strategies collectively
replicates the mass-effect; (4) the derived decentralized strategies are shown to be ε-Nash equi-
librium, which justifies the aforementioned scheme for finding the approximate Nash equilibrium.
For further analysis details of MFGs, readers are referred to [1, 5, 13, 19, 25, 42, 43]. That
substantial literatures exists studying linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG)-MFG is remarkable. For
example, [26] studied LQG MFGs using the common Riccati equation approach; [8] adopted
SMP with the help of adjoint equations; [2] and [33] studied ergodic LQG MFGs; [27] studied
LQG MFGs with nonuniform agents through state-aggregation by empirical distribution. For
further research, readers are referred to [3, 7, 41] and the references therein.
All aforementioned mentioned works examine standard MFGs, which (except [28]) require
that all the agents be statistically identical and that the individual influence on the overall pop-
ulation of a single agent be negligible as the number of the agents tends to infinity. However,
in the real world, some models exist in which a major agent has a significant influence on other
agents (called minor agents) no matter how numerous the minor-agents may be. Such interac-
tions exists in numerous socio-economic problems (e.g., [29, 45]). This type of games involving
agents with different power levels is usually called a mixed type games. Compared with MFGs
with only minor agents, a distinctive feature of mixed type MFGs is that the mean field behavior
of the minor agents is affected by the major agent; thus, it is a random process, and the influence
of the major agent on the minor agents is not negligible in the limiting problem. To deal with
such new features, conditional distribution with respect to the major agent’s information flow
is introduced (see [37, 14]).
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We now discuss some works on MFGs with a major agent and minor agents that are related
to our paper. To the best of our knowledge, the first LQG MFG with a major agent and minor
agents was studied by [24], in which the minor agents were from a total K classes. In the study of
[38], the authors examined mean-field LQG mixed games with continuum-parameterized minor
agents. [37] investigated nonlinear stochastic dynamic systems with major and minor agents.
[11] studied nonlinear stochastic differential games, involving a major agent and a large number
of collectively acting minor agents, as two-person zero-sum stochastic differential games of the
type feedback control against feedback control, the limiting behaviors of the saddle point con-
trols were also studied. For further research, readers are referred to [4, 14] and the references
therein.
In this study, we investigated a class of LQGMFGs with major agents and minor agents in the
presence of control constraints. In all of the aforementioned papers about linear quadratic (LQ)
control problems, the control was unconstrained, and the (feedback) control was constructed
from DPP or SMP, which is automatically admissible. Whereas, if we impose constraints on
the admissible control, the whole LQ approach fails to apply, (see e.g., [15, 23]). We empha-
sizes that the LQ control problems with control constraints have wide applications in finance
and economics. For example, the mean-variance problem with prohibiting short-selling can be
transferred to LQ control problems with positive control, (see e.g., [6, 23]). The optimal in-
vestment problems where the agents have relative performance, (i.e., their portfolio constraints
take different forms), can also be tackled through approach of LQ control problems with input
constraint, (see e.g, [20, 17]). Remark 3.1 of the current paper provides several other constraint
sets Γ ⊂ Rm as well as their applications. For an investigation of LQ problems with positive
controls or a more general study where the control is constrained in a given convex cone, readers
are referred to [9] for a deterministic case and [15, 23, 34] for a stochastic case.
To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to examine constrained LQG
MFGs with major agents and large numbers of minor agents. In addition to the control con-
straint being fully new, our study also has other novel features when compared with other
relevant studies: in [24, 38], the diffusion term simply takes a constant; however, this study
considers the mean-field LQG mixed games in which the diffusion term depends on the major
agent’s and the minor agent’s states, as well as the individual control strategy. This creates addi-
tional difficulties, especially when applying the general SMP; in [37, 11], a nonlinear stochastic
differential games was studied; however, in this study, we put ourselves in a LQ mean-field
framework with individual controls constrained in a closed convex set; thus, we can explicitly
present the optimal strategies through a projection operator. Moreover, we use SMP to obtain
the optimal strategies through Hamiltonian systems that are fully coupled forward-backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs); this is different from [37], which used DPP and a
verification theorem to characterize the optimal strategies. Here, we connect the consistency con-
dition to a new type of conditional mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations
(MF-FBSDEs) involving projection operators. We establish its well-posedness under suitable
conditions using a fixed point theorem, both in local cases and global cases. Unlike our previous
paper [21], we now focus on the mixed game, which is more realistic and more difficult. In this
situation, the consistency condition is a conditional MF-FBSDE that does not satisfy the usual
monotonicity condition of [22]. Moreover, we require an additional subtle analysis to analyze
the major agent’s influence and establish the approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, motivated
by [17], we believe that our results can be applied to solve the optimal investment problems
caused by major agent and N minor agents.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the LQG
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MFGs with a control constraint involving a major agent and minor agents. Decentralized strate-
gies are derived through a FBSDE with projection operators. A consistency condition is also
established using some fully coupled FBSDEs that come from the SMP. In Section 3, we prove
the well-posedness of fully coupled conditional MF-FBSDEs, which characterize the consistency
condition in the local time horizon case. In Section 4, we ascertain the wellposedness of the
global time case. In Section 5, we verify the ε−Nash equilibrium of the decentralized strategies.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• To introduce and analyze a new class of LQ mixed MFGs using SMP. In our setting, both
the major agent and minor agents are constrained in their control inputs.
• The diffusion terms of major and minor agents are dependent on their states and control
variables.
• The consistency condition system or NCE is represented through a new type of conditional
mean-filed type FBSDE with projection operators.
• The existence and uniqueness of such an NCE system are established in a local case (i.e.,
small time horizon) using the contraction mapping method, and in a global case (i.e.,
arbitrary time horizon) using the discounting method.
2 Notations and terminology
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0. We assume (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) is a
complete, filtered probability space satisfying usual conditions and {Wi(t), 0 ≤ i ≤ N}0≤t≤T is
a (N+1)-dimensional Brownian motion on this space. Let Ft be the natural filtration generated
by {Wi(s), 0 ≤ i ≤ N, 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and augmented by NP (the class of P-null sets of F). Let
FW0t , FWit , F it be respectively the augmentation of σ{W0(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, σ{Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t},
σ{W0(s),Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} by NP. Here, {FW0t }0≤t≤T stands for the information of the major
agent, while {FWit }0≤t≤T represents the individual information of i-th minor agent.
Throughout the paper, x′ denotes the transpose of a vector or a matrix x, Sn denotes the
set of symmetric n × n matrices with real elements. For a matrix M ∈ Rn×d, we define the
norm |M | := √Tr(M ′M). If M ∈ Sn is positive (semi) definite, we write M > (≥)0. Let H
be a given Hilbert space, the set of H-valued continuous functions is denoted by C(0, T ;H). If
N(·) ∈ C(0, T ;Sn) and N(t) > (≥)0 for every t ∈ [0, T ], we say that N(·) is positive (semi)
definite, which is denoted by N(·) > (≥)0. Now, for a given Hilbert space H and a filtration
{Gt}0≤t≤T , we also introduce the following spaces which will be used in this paper:
L2GT (Ω;H) :=
{
ξ : Ω→ H | ξ is GT -measurable such that E|ξ|2 <∞
}
,
L2G(0, T ;H) :=
{
x(·) : [0, T ]× Ω→H | x(·) is Gt-progressively measurable process such that
E
∫ T
0
|x(t)|2dt <∞
}
,
L2G(Ω;C(0, T ;H)) :=
{
x(·) : [0, T ] × Ω→ H | x(·) is G-adapted continuous process such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|x(t)|2
]
<∞
}
.
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3 LQG mixed games with control constraint
We consider a linear-quadratic-Gaussian mixed mean-field game involving a major agent A0 and
a heterogeneous large-population with N individual minor agents {Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. Unlike
other works of LQG mixed games, our control domain is constrained in a closed convex set of
the full Euclidean space, and more details of constraints will be given later. The states x0 for
major agent A0 and xi for each minor agent Ai are modeled by the following controlled linear
stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with mean-field coupling:
dx0(t) = [A0(t)x0(t) +B0(t)u0(t) + F
1
0 (t)x
(N)(t) + b0(t)]dt
+ [C0(t)x0(t) +D0(t)u0(t) + F
2
0 (t)x
(N)(t) + σ0(t)]dW0(t), x0(0) = x0 ∈ Rn,
(1)
and
dxi(t) = [Aθi(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + F1(t)x
(N)(t) + b(t)]dt
+ [C(t)xi(t) +Dθi(t)ui(t) + F2(t)x
(N)(t) +Hx0(t) + σ(t)]dWi(t), xi(0) = x ∈ Rn,
(2)
where x(N)(·) = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi(·) is the state-average of minor agents. Recalling that F it is the indi-
vidual decentralized information while Ft is the centralized information driven by all Brownian
motion components. We point out that the heterogeneous noise Wi is specific for individual
agent Ai whereas xi(t) is adapted to Ft instead of F it due to the coupling state-average x(N).
The coefficients of (1) and (2) are deterministic matrix-valued functions with appropriate di-
mensions. The number θi is a parameter of agent Ai to model a heterogeneous population of
minor agents, for more explanations, see [24]. For sake of notations, in (2), we only set the
coefficients A(·) and D(·) (see also R(·) in (4)) to be dependent on θi. Similar analysis can be
proceeded in case that all other coefficients depend also on θi. In this paper, we assume that
θi takes values from a finite set Θ := {1, 2, . . . ,K} which means that totally K types of minor
agents are considered. We call Ai a k-type minor agent if θi = k ∈ Θ.
In this paper, we are interested in the asymptotic behavior as N tends to infinity which is
essentially to consider a family of games with an increasing number of minor agents. To describe
the related large population system, let us first define
Ik = {i | θi = k, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, Nk = |Ik|,
where Nk is the cardinality of index set Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Let π(N)k = NkN for k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}
then π(N) = (π
(N)
1 , · · · , π(N)K ) is a probability vector to represent the empirical distribution of
θ1, · · · , θN . The following assumption gives some statistical properties for θi. For more details,
the reader is referred to [24]:
(A1) There exists a probability mass vector π = (π1, π2, · · · , πK) such that limN→+∞ π(N) = π
and min1≤k≤K πk > 0.
From (A1) we know that when N → +∞, the proportion of k-type agents becomes stable for
each k and that the number of each type agents tends to infinity. Otherwise, the agents in
given type with bounded size should be excluded from consideration when analyzing asymptotic
behavior as N → +∞. Throughout the paper we make the convention that N is suitable large
such that min1≤k≤K Nk ≥ 1.
Now let us specify the admissible control set and cost functionals of our linear-quadratic-
Gaussian mixed game with input control constraint. We call u0 an admissible control for the
major agent if u0 ∈ U0ad, where U0ad := {u(·) | u(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ; Γ0)}. Here Γ0 ⊂ Rm is a nonempty
closed convex set. Moreover, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we also define decentralized admissible control
ui for the minor agent Ai as ui ∈ U iad, where for a nonempty closed convex set Γθi ⊂ Rm,
U iad := {ui(·) | ui(·) ∈ L2F i(0, T ; Γθi)}.
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Remark 3.1 We give the following typical examples for the closed convex constraint set Γ: Γ1 =
Rm+ represents that the control can only take positive values, it connects with the mean-variance
portfolio selection problem with no-shorting, see [6, 23]. The linear subspace Γ2 = (Rei)
⊥ (where
(e1, e2, . . . , em) is the canonical basis of R
m) represents that the control can only take from a
hyperplane, it is used to deal with that in the investment theory, each manager has access to the
whole market except some fixed firm who has private information. For more examples of linear
constraints and their economic meaning, the reader is referred to [17]. Γ can also be some closed
cone (i.e. Γ is closed and if u ∈ Γ, then αu ∈ Γ, for all α ≥ 0), e.g. Γ3 = {u ∈ Rm : Υu = 0} or
Γ4 = {u ∈ Rm : Υu ≤ 0}, where Υ ∈ Rn×m. For investigations on the stochastic LQ problems
with conic control constraint, the readers are refereed to [15, 23].
Let u = (u0, u1, · · · , uN ) be the set of strategies of all N + 1 agents, u−0 = (u1, u2, . . . , uN )
be the control strategies except A0 and u−i = (u0, u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · · , uN ) be the set of
strategies except the i-th agent Ai. We introduce the cost functional of the major agent as
J0(u0, u−0) = 1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
〈
Q0(t)
(
x0(t)− ρ0x(N)(t)
)
, x0(t)− ρ0x(N)(t)
〉
+
〈
R0(t)u0(t), u0(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G0
(
x0(T )− ρ0x(N)(T )
)
, x0(T )− ρ0x(N)(T )
〉] (3)
and the cost functional of the minor agent Ai as
Ji(ui, u−i) =1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
xi−ρx(N)−(1−ρ)x0(t)
)
, xi−ρx(N)−(1−ρ)x0(t)
〉
+
〈
Rθiui, ui
〉)
dt
+
〈
G
(
xi(T )−ρx(N)(T )−(1−ρ)x0(T )
)
, xi(T )−ρx(N)(T )−(1−ρ)x0(T )
〉]
.
(4)
We mention that for notational brevity, the time argument is suppressed in above equation as
well as in the sequel when necessary.
We impose the following assumptions:
(A2) The coefficients of the states satisfy that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
A0(·), Aθi(·), C0(·), C(·), F 10 (·), F1(·), F 20 (·), F2(·),H(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n),
B0(·), B(·),D0(·),Dθi(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m), b0(·), b(·), σ0(·), σ(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn).
(A3) The coefficients of cost functionals satisfy that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
Q0(·), Q(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sn), R0(·), Rθi(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm), G0, G ∈ Sn,
Q0(·) ≥ 0, Q(·) ≥ 0, R0(·) > 0, Rθi(·) > 0, G0 ≥ 0, G ≥ 0, ρ0, ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Here L∞(0, T ;H) denotes the space of uniformly bounded functions mapping from [0, T ] to H.
It follows that, under assumptions (A2) and (A3), the system (1) and (2) admits a unique solu-
tion x0, xi(·) ∈ L2F (Ω;C(0, T ;Rn)) for given admissible control u0 and ui. Now, let us formulate
the LQG mixed games with control constraint.
Problem (CC). Find a strategies set u¯ = (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯N ) where u¯i(·) ∈ U iad, 0 ≤ i ≤ N ,
such that
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈U iad
Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·)), 0 ≤ i ≤ N.
We call u¯ an optimal strategies set for Problem (CC).
For comparison, we present also the definition of ε-Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 3.1 A set of strategies u¯i(·) ∈ U iad, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, is called an ε-Nash equilibrium with
respect to costs J i, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, if there exists a ε = ε(N) ≥ 0, lim
N→+∞
ε(N) = 0, such that for
any 0 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) ≤ Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·)) + ε,
when any alternative strategy ui ∈ U iad is applied by Ai.
Remark 3.2 If ε = 0, Definition 3.1 reduces to the usual exact Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Stochastic optimal control problem of the major agent
As explained in introduction, the centralized optimization strategies to Problem (CC), are
rather complicate and infeasible to be applied when the number of the agents tends to infinity.
Alternatively, we investigate the decentralized strategies via the limiting problem with the help
of frozen limiting state-average. To this end, we first figure out the representation of limiting
process using heuristic arguments. Based on it, we can find the decentralized strategies by
consistency condition, and then rigorously verify the derived strategies satisfy the approximate
Nash equilibrium. We formalize the auxiliary limiting mixed game via the approximation of the
average state x(N). Since π
(N)
k ≈ πk for large N and
x(N) =
1
N
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Ik
xi =
K∑
k=1
π
(N)
k
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
xi,
we may approximate x(N) by
∑K
k=1 πkmk, where mk ∈ Rn is used to approximate 1Nk
∑
i∈Ik xi.
Denote m = (m′1,m′2, . . . m′k)
′, which is called the set of aggregate quantities. Replacing x(N) of
(1) and (3) by
∑K
k=1 πkmk, the major agent’s dynamics is given by
dz0(t) = [A0(t)z0(t) +B0(t)u0(t) + F
1
0 (t)
K∑
k=1
πkmk(t) + b0(t)]dt
+ [C0(t)z0(t) +D0(t)u0(t) + F
2
0 (t)
K∑
k=1
πkmk(t) + σ0(t)]dW0(t), z0(0) = x0 ∈ Rn,
(5)
and the limiting cost functional is
J0(u0) =
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
〈
Q0(t)
(
z0(t)− ρ0
K∑
k=1
πkmk(t)
)
, z0(t)− ρ0
K∑
k=1
πkmk(t)
〉
+
〈
R0(t)u0(t), u0(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G0
(
z0(T )− ρ0
K∑
k=1
πkmk(T )
)
, z0(T )− ρ0
K∑
k=1
πkmk(T )
〉]
.
(6)
For simplicity, let ⊗ be the Kronecker product of two matrix (see [18]) and we denote F 1,pi0 :=
π ⊗ F 10 , F 2,pi0 := π ⊗ F 20 , ρpi0 := π ⊗ ρ0In×n. Then (5) and (6) become respectively to
dz0(t) = [A0(t)z0(t) +B0(t)u0(t) + F
1,pi
0 (t)m(t) + b0(t)]dt
+ [C0(t)z0(t) +D0(t)u0(t) + F
2,pi
0 (t)m(t) + σ0(t)]dW0(t), z0(0) = x0 ∈ Rn,
(7)
and
J0(u0) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
〈
Q0(t)
(
z0(t)− ρpi0m(t)
)
, z0(t)− ρpi0m(t)
〉
+
〈
R0(t)u0(t), u0(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G0
(
z0(T )− ρpi0m(T )
)
, z0(T )− ρpi0m(T )
〉]
.
7
We define the following auxiliary stochastic optimal control problem for major agent with
infinite population:
Problem (LCC-Major). For major agent A0, find u∗0(·) ∈ U0ad satisfying
J0(u
∗
0(·)) = inf
u0(·)∈U0ad
J0(u0(·)).
Then u∗0(·) is called a decentralized optimal control for Problem (LCC-Major).
Now, similar to [21], we would like to apply SMP to above limiting LQG problem (LCC-
Major) with input constraint. We introduce the following first order adjoint equation:{
dp0(t) = −
[
A′0(t)p0(t)−Q0(t)(z0(t)− ρpi0m(t)) + C ′0(t)q0(t)
]
dt+ q0(t)dW0(t),
p0(T ) = −G0
(
z0(T )− ρpi0m(T )
)
,
(8)
as well as the Hamiltonian function
H0(t, p, q, x, u) =
〈
p,A0x+B0u+ F
1,pi
0 m+ b0
〉
+
〈
q, C0x+D0u+ F
2,pi
0 m+ σ0
〉
− 1
2
〈
Q0(x− ρpi0m), x− ρpi0m
〉− 1
2
〈
R0u, u
〉
.
Since Γ0 is a closed convex set, for optimal control u
∗
0, related optimal state z
∗
0 and related
solution (p∗0, q∗0) to (8), the SMP reads as the following local form〈
∂H0
∂u
(t, p∗0, q
∗
0 , z
∗
0 , u
∗
0), u− u∗0
〉
≤ 0, for all u ∈ Γ0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s. (9)
Similar to the argument in page 5 of [21], using the well-known results of convex analysis (see
Theorem 5.2 of [10] or Theorem 4.1 of [21]), we obtain that (9) is equivalent to
u∗0(t) = PΓ0 [R
−1
0 (t)(B
′
0(t)p
∗
0(t) +D
′
0(t)q
∗
0)(t)], a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],P − a.s. (10)
where PΓ0 [·] is the projection mapping from Rm to its closed convex subset Γ0 under the norm
‖ · ‖R0 (where ‖x‖2R0 = 〈〈x, x〉〉 :=
〈
R
1
2
0 x,R
1
2
0 x
〉
). Finally, by substituting (10) in (7) and (8), we
get the following Hamiltonian system for the major agent:
dz0 =
(
A0z0 +B0PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0p0 +D
′
0q0
)]
+ F 1,pi0 m+ b0
)
dt
+
(
C0z0 +D0PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0p0 +D
′
0q0
)]
+ F 2,pi0 m+ σ0
)
dW0(t),
dp0 = −
(
A′0p0 −Q0(z0 − ρpi0m) + C ′0q0
)
dt+ q0dW0(t),
z0(0) = x0, p0(T ) = −G0
(
z0(T )− ρpi0m(T )
)
.
(11)
3.2 Stochastic optimal control problem for minor agent
By denoting F 1,pi := π ⊗ F1, F 2,pi := π ⊗ F2, ρpi := π ⊗ ρIn×n, the limiting state of minor agent
Ai is dzi =
(
Aθizi +Bui + F
1,pim+ b
)
dt+
(
Czi +Dθiui + F
2,pim+Hz0 + σ
)
dWi(t),
zi(0) =x.
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The limiting cost functional is given by:
Ji(ui) =
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
zi−ρ
K∑
k=1
πkmk−(1−ρ)z0
)
, zi−ρ
K∑
k=1
πkmk−(1−ρ)z0
〉
+
〈
Rθiui, ui
〉)
dt
+
〈
G
(
zi(T )− ρ
K∑
k=1
πkmk(T )− (1− ρ)z0(T )
)
, zi(T )− ρ
K∑
k=1
πkmk(T )− (1− ρ)z0(T )
〉]
,
(12)
or equivalently by
Ji(ui) =
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
zi − ρpim−(1−ρ)z0
)
, zi − ρpim−(1−ρ)z0
〉
+
〈
Rθiui, ui
〉)
dt
+
〈
G
(
zi(T )− ρpim(T )−(1−ρ)z0(T )
)
, zi(T )− ρpim(T )−(1−ρ)z0(T )
〉]
,
and the related limiting stochastic optimal control problem for the minor agents is:
Problem (LCC-Minor). For each minor agent Ai, find u∗i (·) ∈ U iad satisfying
Ji(u
∗
i (·)) = inf
ui(·)∈U iad
Ji(ui(·)).
Then u∗i (·) is called a decentralized optimal control for Problem (LCC-Minor).
Similar to the major agent, we obtain the following Hamiltonian system for minor agent Ai,
dzi =
(
Aθizi +BPΓθi
[
R−1θi
(
B′pi +D′θiqi
)]
+ F pi1 m+ b
)
dt
+
(
Czi +DθiPΓθi
[
R−1θi
(
B′pi +D′θiqi
)]
+ F pi2 m+Hz0 + σ
)
dWi(t),
dpi =−
(
A′θipi −Q(zi − ρpim− (1− ρ)z0) + C ′qi
)
dt+ qidWi(t) + qi,0dW0(t),
zi(0) =x, pi(T ) = −G
(
zi(T )− ρpim(T )− (1− ρ)z0(T )
)
.
(13)
Here, PΓθi [·] is the projection mapping from Rm to its closed convex subset Γθi under the norm‖ · ‖Rθi . We mention that the limiting minor agent’s state zi depends also on the limiting major
agent’s state z0, it makes that zi is F i-adapted, thus qi,0dW0(t) appears in the adjoint equation.
3.3 Consistency condition system for mixed game
Let us first focus on the k-type minor agent. When i ∈ Ik = {i | θi = k}, we denote Aθi = Ak,
Dθi = Dk, Rθi = Rk and Γθi = Γk. We would like to approximate xi by zi when N → +∞,
thus mk should satisfy the consistency condition (noticing that Assumption (A1) implies that
Nk →∞ if N →∞)
mk(·) = lim
N→+∞
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
zi(·).
Recall that for i, j ∈ Ik, zi and zj are identically distributed, and conditional independent (under
E(· |FW0· )). Thus by conditional strong law of large number, we have (the convergence is in the
sense of almost surely, see e.g. [36])
mk(·) = lim
N→+∞
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
zi(·) = E(zi(·)|FW0· ), (14)
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where zi is given by (13) with Aθi = Ak,Dθi = Dk, Rθi = Rk,Γθi = Γk. By combining (11),
(13) and (14), we get the following consistency condition system or Nash certainty equivalence
principle of k-type minor agent, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K: (As mentioned before, for notational brevity,
the time argument is suppressed in following equations except E(αk(t)|FW0t ) to emphasise its
dependence on conditional expectation under FW0t )
dαk =
(
Akαk+BPΓk
[
R−1k
(
B′βk+D′kγk
)]
+F1
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+b
)
dt
+
(
Cαk +DkPΓk
[
R−1k
(
B′βk +D′kγk
)]
+F2
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+Hα0+σ
)
dWk(t),
dβk =−
(
A′kβk−Q(αk−ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )−(1−ρ)α0)+C ′γk
)
dt+γkdWk(t)+γk,0dW0(t),
αk(0) = x, βk(T ) = −G
(
αk(T )− ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(T )|FW0T )− (1− ρ)α0(T )
)
,
(15)
where α0 satisfies the following FBSDE which is coupled with all k-type minor agents:
dα0 =
(
A0α0+B0PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0β0+D
′
0γ0
)]
+F 10
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+b0
)
dt
+
(
C0α0 +D0PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0β0+D
′
0γ0
)]
+F 20
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+σ0
)
dW0(t),
dβ0 = −
(
A′0β0 −Q0(α0 − ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )) + C ′0γ0
)
dt+ γ0dW0(t),
α0(0) = x0, β0(T ) = −G0
(
α0(T )− ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(T )|FW0T )
)
.
(16)
We consider together the major agent and all kinds of minor agents, i.e. (16) and (15) for all
1 ≤ k ≤ K, then there arise 2K+2 fully coupled equations includingK+1 forward equations and
K+1 backward equations. Such fully coupled equations are called consistency condition system.
Once we can solve it, then mk = E(αk(t)|FW0t ) which depends on the conditional distribution
of αk, this allows us, in (15), to use arbitrary Brownian motion Wk which is independent of W0.
Finally, let us introduce the following notation which will be used in the following sections
Φ(t) :=
K∑
i=1
πimi =
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t ). (17)
4 Existence and uniqueness of consistency condition system: lo-
cal time horizon case
This section aims to establish the well-posedness of consistency condition system (15)-(16) in
small time duration using the method of contraction mapping. Similar to the classical results
on FBSDEs, see for example Chapter 1 Section 5 of Ma and Yong [35], we need introduce the
following additional assumption:
(A4) We suppose R−10 (·), R−1θi (·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm) andM0|D|2 < 1, where |D| := max0≤k≤K |Dk|
and M0 := max
{|G0|2(1 + ρ20), |G|2(1 + ρ2 + (1− ρ)2)}.
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For simplicity, we denote
ϕ0(p, q) := PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0p+D
′
0q
)]
, ϕθi(p, q) := PΓθi
[
R−1θi
(
B′p+D′θiq
)]
.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 Assume (A1)-(A4), then there exists a T0 > 0, such that for any T ∈ (0, T0],
the system (15)-(16) has a unique solution (α0, β0, γ0, αk, βk, γk, γk,0), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, satisfying
α0, β0 ∈ L2FW0 (Ω;C(0, T ;Rn)), αk, βk ∈ L2Fk(Ω;C(0, T ;Rn)),
γ0 ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn), γk, γk,0 ∈ L2Fk(0, T ;Rn), 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
(18)
Proof Let T0 ∈ (0, 1] be undetermined and 0 < T ≤ T0. We denote
N [0, T ] :=L2FW0 (Ω;C(0, T ;Rn))× L2F1(Ω;C(0, T ;Rn))× . . .× L2FK (Ω;C(0, T ;Rn))
× L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn)× L2F1(0, T ;Rn)× . . .× L2FK (0, T ;Rn)
× L2F1(0, T ;Rn)× . . .× L2FK (0, T ;Rn).
For (Y0, Y1, . . . , YK , Z0, Z1, . . . , ZK ,Υ1,0, . . . ,ΥK,0) ∈ N [0, T ], we introduce the following norm:
‖(Y0, Y1, . . . , YK , Z0, Z1, . . . , ZK ,Υ1,0, . . . ,ΥK,0)‖2N [0,T ]
:= sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
{ K∑
k=0
|Yk(t)|2 +
K∑
k=0
∫ T
0
|Zk(s)|2ds+
K∑
k=1
∫ T
0
|Υk,0(s)|2ds
}
.
(19)
Let N [0, T ] be the completion of N [0, T ] in L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn)×L2F1(0, T ;Rn)×. . .×L2Fk(0, T ;Rn)×
L2FW0 (0, T ;R
n)×L2F1(0, T ;Rn)× . . .×L2Fk(0, T ;Rn)×L2F1(0, T ;Rn)× . . .×L2FK (0, T ;Rn) under
norm (19). Now for any
(Y j0 , Y
j
1 , . . . , Y
j
K , Z
j
0 , Z
j
1 , . . . , Z
j
K ,Υ
j
1,0, . . . ,Υ
j
k,0) ∈ N [0, T ], j = 1, 2,
we solve respectively the following system including K + 1 SDEs, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K:
dα
j
0 =
(
A0α
j
0 +B0ϕ0(Y
j
0 , Z
j
0) + F
1
0
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (t)|FW0t ] + b0
)
dt
+
(
C0α
j
0 +D0ϕ0(Y
j
0 , Z
j
0) + F
2
0
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (t)|FW0t ] + σ0
)
dW0(t)
dα
j
k =
(
Akα
j
k +Bϕk(Y
j
k , Z
j
k) + F1
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (t)|FW0t ] + b
)
dt
+
(
Cα
j
k +Dkϕk(Y
j
k , Z
j
k) + F2
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (t)|FW0t ] +Hαj0 + σ
)
dWk(t)
α
j
0(0) = x0, α
j
k(0) = x.
(20)
Then (20) admits a unique solution for j = 1, 2,
(αj0, α
j
1, . . . , α
j
K) ∈ L2FW0 (Ω;C(0, T ;Rn))× L2F1(Ω;C(0, T ;Rn))× . . .× L2FK (Ω;C(0, T ;Rn)).
Indeed, (20) is a n(K +1)-dimensional SDE with the mean-field term
∑K
i=1 πiE[αi(t)|FW0t ]. We
can prove the well-posedness of such SDEs system by noticing E|E[αi(t)|FW0t ]|2 ≤ E|αi(t)|2 and
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by constructing a fixed point using the classical contraction mapping method, we omit the proof
here. Now let us denote for 0 ≤ k ≤ K,
αˆk := α
1
k − α2k, ϕˆk := ϕk(Y 1k , Z1k)− ϕk(Y 2k , Z2k)
Yˆk := Y
1
k − Y 2k , Zˆk := Z1k − Z2k , Υˆk,0 := Υ1k,0 −Υ2k,0.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
d|αˆ0|2 =2
〈
αˆ0, A0αˆ0 +B0ϕˆ0 + F
1
0
K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(t)|FW0t ]
〉
dt
+
∣∣∣C0αˆ0 +D0ϕˆ0 + F 20 K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(t)|FW0t ]
∣∣∣2dt
+ 2
〈
αˆ0, C0αˆ0 +D0ϕˆ0 + F
2
0
K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(t)|FW0t ]
〉
dW0(t)
and
d|αˆk|2 =2
〈
αˆk, Akαˆk +Bϕˆk + F1
K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(t)|FW0t ]
〉
dt
+
∣∣∣Cαˆk +Dkϕˆk + F2 K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(t)|FW0t ] +Hαˆ0
∣∣∣2
+ 2
〈
αˆk, Cαˆk +Dkϕˆk + F2
K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(t)|FW0t ] +Hαˆ0
〉
dWk(t).
Thus by using (A2)-(A3), E
∣∣E[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]∣∣ ≤ E|αˆi(s)|, E ∣∣E[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]∣∣2 ≤ E|αˆi(s)|2 as well
as that ϕk is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant 1(see Proposition 4.2 of [21]), we have
E|αˆ0(t)|2 ≤2E
∫ t
0
(
|A0||αˆ0|2 + |B0||αˆ0||ϕˆ0|+ |F 10 ||αˆ0|
K∑
i=1
∣∣E[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]∣∣ )ds
+ E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣C0αˆ0 +D0ϕˆ0 + F 20
K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
≤CεE
∫ t
0
K∑
i=0
|αˆi|2ds+ E
∫ t
0
(|D0|2 + ε)(|Yˆ0|2 + |Zˆ0|2)ds
(21)
and
E|αˆk(t)|2 ≤2E
∫ t
0
(
|Ak||αˆk|2 + |B||αˆk||ϕˆk|+ |F1||αˆk|
K∑
i=1
∣∣E[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]∣∣ )ds
+ E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣Cαˆk +Dkϕˆk +
K∑
i=1
F2E[αˆi(s)|FW0s ] +Hαˆ0
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
≤CεE
∫ t
0
K∑
i=0
|αˆi|2ds+ E
∫ t
0
(|Dk|2 + ε)(|Yˆk|2 + |Zˆk|2)ds,
(22)
where Cε is a constant independent of T , which may vary line by line. Adding up (21) and (22)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have
E
K∑
i=0
|αˆi(t)|2 ≤ CεE
∫ t
0
K∑
i=0
|αˆi(s)|2ds+ E
∫ t
0
K∑
i=0
(|Di|2 + ε)(|Yˆi|2 + |Zˆi|2)ds,
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and the Gronwall’s inequality yields
E
K∑
i=0
|αˆi(t)|2 ≤ eCεTE
∫ T
0
K∑
i=0
(|Di|2 + ε)(|Yˆi|2 + |Zˆi|2)ds. (23)
Next, we solve the following BSDEs, for j = 1, 2,
dβ
j
0 = −
[
A′0Y
j
0 −Q0
(
α
j
0 − ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (t)|FW0t ]
)
+ C ′0Z
j
0
]
dt+ γj0dW0(t),
dβ
j
k = −
[
A′kY
j
k −Q
(
α
j
k − ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (t)|FW0t ]
)− (1− ρ)αj0 + C ′Zjk]dt
+ γjkdWk(t) + γ
j
k,0dW0(t),
β
j
0(T ) = −G0
(
α
j
0(T )− ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (T )|FW0T ]
)
,
β
j
k(T ) = −G
(
α
j
k(T )− ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE[α
j
i (T )|FW0T ]− (1− ρ)αj0(T )
)
.
(24)
Since (A2)-(A3) hold and αi, 0 ≤ i ≤ K have been solved from (20), the classical result of
BSDEs yields that (24) admits a unique solution
(βj0, β
j
1, . . . , β
j
K , γ
j
0, γ
j
1, . . . , γ
j
K , γ
j
1,0, . . . , γ
j
K,0) ∈ N [0, T ] ⊆ N [0, T ].
Thus we have defined a mapping through (20) and (24)
T :N [0, T ]→ N [0, T ],
(Y j0 , Y
j
1 , . . . , Y
j
K , Z
j
0 , Z
j
1 , . . . , Z
j
K ,Υ
j
1,0, . . . ,Υ
j
K,0) 7→ (β
j
0, β
j
1 , . . . , β
j
K , γ
j
0, γ
j
1 , . . . , γ
j
K , γ
j
1,0, . . . , γ
j
K,0).
Similarly, we denote
βˆk := β
1
k − β2k, γˆk := γ1k − γ2k , for 0 ≤ k ≤ K and γˆk,0 := γ1k,0 − γ2k,0, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to |βˆ0(t)|2, and noticing E
∣∣E[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]∣∣2 ≤ E|αˆi(s)|2 , we obtain
E
(
|βˆ0(t)|2 +
∫ T
t
|γˆ0|2ds
)
=E|βˆ0(T )|2 + 2E
∫ T
t
〈
βˆ0, A
′
0Yˆ0 −Q0
(
αˆ0 − ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(s)|FW0s ]
)
+ C ′0Zˆ0
〉
ds
≤|G0|2(1 + ρ20)E
K∑
i=0
|αˆi(T )|2+CεE
∫ T
t
|βˆ0|2ds+ E
∫ T
t
K∑
i=0
|αˆi|2ds+ε
∫ T
t
(|Yˆ0|2+|Zˆ0|2)ds.
Substituting (23) into above inequality, we have
E
(
|βˆ0(t)|2+
∫ T
t
|γˆ0|2ds
)
≤ (|G0|2(1 + ρ20)+T ) eCεTE K∑
i=0
∫ T
0
(|Di|2 + ε)(|Yˆi|2 + |Zˆi|2)ds
+ CεE
∫ T
t
|βˆ0|2ds+ ε
∫ T
t
(|Yˆ0|2 + |Zˆ0|2)ds.
(25)
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Similarly, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to |βˆk(t)|2, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have
E
∣∣∣βˆk(t)∣∣∣2 + E ∫ T
t
|γˆk|2 ds + E
∫ T
t
|γˆk,0|2 ds
=E
∣∣∣βˆk(T )∣∣∣2+2E ∫ T
t
〈
βˆk, A
′
kYˆk−Q
(
αˆk−ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE
[
αˆi(s)|FW0s
]−(1−ρ)αˆ0
)
−C ′Zˆk
〉
ds.
(26)
Noticing that ρ ∈ [0, 1], we have
E
∣∣∣βˆk(T )∣∣∣2 ≤|G|2∣∣∣αˆk(T )− ρ K∑
i=1
πiE[αˆi(T )|FW0T ]− (1− ρ)αˆ0(T )
∣∣∣2
≤|G|2(1 + ρ2 + (1− ρ)2)
E ∣∣∣αˆk(T )− ρE[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]∣∣∣2 + K∑
i=0,i 6=k
E|αˆi(T )|2

≤|G|2(1 + ρ2 + (1− ρ)2)E
K∑
i=0
|αˆi(T )|2,
where we have used the fact that
E
∣∣∣αˆk(T )− ρE[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]∣∣∣2
=E|αˆk(T )|2 + ρ2E|E[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]|2 − 2ρE
[
αˆk(T )E[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]
]
=E|αˆk(T )|2 + ρ2E|E[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]|2 − 2ρE
(
E
[
αˆk(T )E[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]
]
|FW0T
)
=E|αˆk(T )|2 + (ρ2 − 2ρ)E|E[αˆk(T )|FW0T ]|2 ≤ E |αˆk(T )|2 .
Thus, (26) yields that
E
∣∣∣βˆk(t)∣∣∣2 + E ∫ T
t
|γˆk|2 ds+ E
∫ T
t
|γˆk,0|2 ds
=E
∣∣∣βˆk(T )∣∣∣2 + 2E ∫ T
t
〈
βˆk, A
′
kYˆk −Q
(
αˆk − ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE
[
αˆi(s)|FW0s
]− (1− ρ)αˆ0
)
− C ′Zˆk
〉
ds
≤|G|2(1 + ρ2 + (1− ρ)2)E
K∑
i=0
|αˆi(T )|2 + CεE
∫ T
t
|βk|2 ds
+ E
∫ T
t
K∑
i=0
|αi|2 ds+ εE
∫ T
t
(|Yˆk|2 + |Zˆk|2)ds.
Substituting (23) into above inequality, we have
E
∣∣∣βˆk(t)∣∣∣2 + E ∫ T
t
|γˆk|2 ds+ E
∫ T
t
|γˆk,0|2 ds
≤ (|G|2(1 + ρ2 + (1− ρ)2)+T ) eCεTE K∑
i=0
∫ T
0
(|Di|2+ε)(|Yˆi|2+|Zˆi|2)ds
+CεE
∫ T
t
|βˆk|2ds+ εE
∫ T
t
(|Yˆk|2 + |Zˆk|2)ds.
(27)
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Adding up (25) and (27) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we obtain (recall |D|2 := max0≤k≤K |Dk|2 and
M0 := max
{|G0|2(1 + ρ20), |G|2(1 + ρ2 + (1− ρ)2)})
E
K∑
i=0
∣∣∣βˆi∣∣∣2 + E K∑
i=0
∫ T
t
|γˆi|2 ds + E
K∑
i=1
∫ T
t
|γˆi,0|2 ds
≤ (M0+T ) eCεTE
K∑
i=0
∫ T
0
(|Di|2+ε)(|Yˆi|2+|Zˆi|2)ds
+CεE
∫ T
t
K∑
i=0
∣∣∣βˆi∣∣∣2 ds+ εE ∫ T
0
K∑
i=0
(|Yˆi|2+|Zˆi|2)ds
≤CεE
∫ T
t
K∑
i=0
∣∣∣βˆi∣∣∣2 ds+ [(M0+T ) eCεT (|D|2 + ε)+ε]E K∑
i=0
∫ T
0
(|Yˆi|2 + |Zˆi|2)ds.
The Gronwall’s inequality yields that
E
K∑
i=0
∣∣∣βˆi∣∣∣2 + E K∑
i=0
∫ T
t
|γˆi|2 ds+ E
K∑
i=1
∫ T
t
|γˆi,0|2 ds
≤eCεT [(M0+T ) eCεT (|D|2 + ε) + ε]E K∑
i=0
∫ T
0
(|Yˆi|2 + |Zˆi|2)ds
≤eCεTT [(M0+T ) eCεT (|D|2 + ε) + ε] sup
0≤t≤T
E
K∑
i=0
|Yˆi(t)|2
+ eCεT
[
(M0+T ) e
CεT (|D|2 + ε) + ε]E K∑
i=0
∫ T
0
|Zˆi|2ds
≤eCεT (T + 1) [(M0+T ) eCεT (|D|2 + ε) + ε]
· ‖(Yˆ0, Yˆ1, . . . , YˆK , Zˆ0, Zˆ1, . . . , ZˆK , Υˆ1,0, . . . , ΥˆK,0)‖N [0,T ]
=eCεT (T + 1)
[
M0e
CεT (|D|2 + ε) + ε+ TeCεT (|D|2 + ε)]
· ‖(Yˆ0, Yˆ1, . . . , YˆK , Zˆ0, Zˆ1, . . . , ZˆK , Υˆ1,0, . . . , ΥˆK,0)‖N [0,T ]
(28)
Noticing that assumption (A4) holds, by first choosing ε > 0 small enough such thatM0(|D|2+
ε) + ε < 1, then choosing T > 0 small enough, we obtain from (28) that
‖(βˆ0, βˆ1, . . . , βˆK , γˆ0, γˆ1, . . . , γˆK , γˆ1,0, . . . , γˆK,0)‖N [0,T ]
≤δ‖(Yˆ0, Yˆ1, . . . , YˆK , Zˆ0, Zˆ1, . . . , ZˆK , Υˆ1,0, . . . , ΥˆK,0)‖N [0,T ],
for some 0 < δ < 1. This means that the mapping T : N [0, T ]→ N [0, T ] is contractive. By the
contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique fixed point
(β0, β1, . . . , βK , γ0, γ1, . . . , γK , γ1,0, . . . , γK,0) ∈ N [0, T ].
Moreover, classical BSDE theory allows us to show that
(β0, β1, . . . , βK , γ0, γ1, . . . , γK , γ1,0, . . . , γK,0) ∈ N [0, T ].
Let αk, 0 ≤ k ≤ K, be the corresponding solution of (20). Then, one can obtain that the system
(15)-(16) has a unique solution (α0, β0, γ0, αk, βk, γk, γk,0), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, such that (18) holds.
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5 Existence and uniqueness of consistency condition system-
global time horizon case
The section aims to establish the well-posedness of consistency condition system (15)-(16) for
arbitrary T , we first study one general kind of conditional mean-field forward-backward stochas-
tic differential equations (MF-FBSDE) by using the discounting method of Pardoux and Tang
[39].
Let (Ω,F ,P) is a complete, filtered probability space satisfying usual conditions and {Wi(t), 0 ≤
i ≤ d}0≤t≤T is a d+1-dimensional Brownian motion on this space. Let Ft be the natural filtra-
tion generated by {Wi(s), 0 ≤ i ≤ d, 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and augmented by NP (the class of P-null sets
of F). Let FW0t be the augmentation of σ{W0(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} by NP. We consider the following
general conditional MF-FBSDE:
dX(s) = b(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s)])ds + σ(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s))dW (s),
−dY (s) = f(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s))ds − Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = x, Y (T ) = g(X(T ),E[X(T )|FW0T ]),
(29)
where the adapted processes X,Y,Z take their values in Rn,Rl and Rl×(d+1), respectively. The
coefficients b, σ and f are defined on Ω×[0, T ]×Rn×Rn×Rl×Rl×(d+1), such that b(·, ·, x,m, y, z),
σ(·, ·, x,m, y, z) and f(·, ·, x,m, y, z) are {Ft}-progressively measurable processes, for all fixed
(x,m, y, z) ∈ Rn×Rn×Rl×Rl×(d+1). The coefficient g is defined on Ω×Rn×Rn and g(·, x,m)
is FT -measurable, for all fixed (x,m) ∈ Rn × Rn. Moreover, the functions b, σ, f and g are
continuous w.r.t. (x,m, y, z) ∈ Rn × Rn ×Rl × Rl×(d+1) and satisfy the following assumptions:
(H1) There exist λ1, λ2 ∈ R and positive constants k0, ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 such that for all t, x,
x1, x2, m, m1, m2, y, y1, y2, z, z1, z2 a.s.
(i) 〈b(t, x1,m, y, z) − b(t, x2,m, y, z), x1 − x2〉 ≤ λ1|x1 − x2|2,
(ii) |b(t, x,m1, y1, z1)− b(t, x,m2, y2, z2)| ≤ k1|m1 −m2|+ k2|y1 − y2|+ k3|z1 − z2|,
(iii) |b(t, x,m, y, z)| ≤ |b(t, 0,m, y, z)| + k0(1 + |x|),
(iv) 〈f(t, x,m, y1, z)− f(t, x,m, y2, z), y1 − y2〉 ≤ λ2|y1 − y2|2,
(v) |f(t, x1,m1, y, z1)− f(t, x1,m2, y, z2)| ≤ k4|x1 − x2|+ k5|m1 −m2|+ k6|z1 − z2|,
(vi) |f(t, x,m, y, z)| ≤ |f(t, x,m, 0, z)| + k0(1 + |y|),
(vii) |σ(t, x1,m1, y1, z1)− σ(t, x2,m2, y2, z2)|2
≤ k27 |x1 − x2|2 + k28|m1 −m2|2 + k29|y1 − y2|2 + k210|z1 − z2|2,
(viii) |g(x1,m1)− g(x2,m2)|2 ≤ k211|x1 − x2|+ k212|m1 −m2|.
(H2) It holds that
E
∫ T
0
(|b(s, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2 + |σ(s, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2 + |f(s, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2) ds+ E|g(0, 0)|2 < +∞.
Remark 5.1 From the mean-field structure of (29), sometimes the following conditions holds:
(H1)− (i′) : There exist λ1, k̂1 ∈ R, such that for all t, y, z and process X1, X2, a.s.
E〈b(t,X1,E[X1(t)|FW0t ], y, z) − b(t,X2,E[X2(t)|FW0t ], y, z),X1 −X2〉
≤ (λ1 + k̂1)E|X1 −X2|2.
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For example, if b(t, x,m, y, z) = λ1x+k̂1m+b1(y, z), then it obviously satisfies above assumption.
Indeed, our mean-filed FBSDE satisfies this assumption.
Let H be an Euclidean space. Recall that L2F (0, T ;H), denotes the Hilbert space of H-valued
{Fs}-progressively measurable processes {u(s), s ∈ [0, T ]} such that
‖u‖ :=
(
E
∫ T
0
|u(s)|2ds
)1/2
<∞.
For λ ∈ R, we define an equivalent norm on L2F (0, T ;H):
‖u‖λ :=
(
E
∫ T
0
e−λs|u(s)|2ds
)1/2
.
Now let us consider MF-FBSDE (29), its fully-coupled structure arises difficulties for estab-
lishing its wellposedness. Similar to [39], when the coupling is weak enough, MF-FBSDE (29)
should be solvable. The following is the main results on MF-FBSDE (29) and the proof is give
in the appendix.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that assumption (H1) and (H2) hold. Then there exists a δ0 > 0, which
depends on ki, λ1, λ2, T , for i = 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 such that when k2, k3, k9, k10 ∈ [0, δ0), there
exists a unique adapted solution (X,Y,Z) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn) × L2F (0, T ;Rm) × L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1))
to MF-FBSDE (29). Further, if 2(λ1 + λ2) < −2k1 − k26 − k27 − k28, there exists a δ1 > 0,
which depends on ki, λ1, λ2, for i = 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and is independent of T , such that when
k2, k3, k9, k10 ∈ [0, δ1), there exists a unique adapted solution (X,Y,Z) to MF-FBSDE (29).
Remark 5.2 If in additional (H1) − (i′) holds (see Remark 5.1), by repeating the above dis-
cussion, one can show that if 2(λ1 + λ2) < −2k̂1 − k26 − k27 − k28, there exists a δ1 > 0, which
depends on k̂1, ki, λ1, λ2, for i = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and is independent of T , such that when
k2, k3, k9, k10 ∈ [0, δ1), there exists a unique adapted solution (X,Y,Z) to MF-FBSDE (29).
Now let us apply Theorem 5.1 to obtain the well-posedness of consistency condition system
(15)-(16) which is
dαk =
(
Akαk+BPΓk
[
R−1k
(
B′βk+D′kγk
)]
+F1
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+b
)
dt
+
(
Cαk +DkPΓk
[
R−1k
(
B′βk +D′kγk
)]
+F2
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+Hα0+σ
)
dWk(t),
dβk =−
(
A′kβk−Q(αk−ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )−(1−ρ)α0)+C ′γk
)
dt+γkdWk(t)+γk,0dW0(t),
αk(0) = x, βk(T ) = −G
(
αk(T )− ρ
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(T )|FW0T )− (1− ρ)α0(T )
)
,
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where α0 satisfies the following FBSDE which is coupled with all k-type minor agents:
dα0 =
(
A0α0+B0PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0β0+D
′
0γ0
)]
+F 10
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+b0
)
dt
+
(
C0α0 +D0PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0β0+D
′
0γ0
)]
+F 20
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )+σ0
)
dW0(t),
dβ0 = −
(
A′0β0 −Q0(α0 − ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(t)|FW0t )) +C ′0γ0
)
dt+ γ0dW0(t),
α0(0) = x0, β0(T ) = −G0
(
α0(T )− ρ0
K∑
i=1
πiE(αi(T )|FW0T )
)
.
Recall that
ϕ0(p, q) = PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0p+D
′
0q
)]
, ϕk(p, q) = PΓk
[
R−1k
(
B′p+D′kq
)]
.
If we denote
W = (W0,W1, . . . ,WK)
′
, Π = (0, π1, . . . , πK), α = (α
′
0, α
′
1, . . . , α
′
K)
′
, β = (β′0, β
′
1, . . . , β
′
K)
′
,
X = (x′0, x
′, . . . , x′)
′
, E(α(t)|FW0t ) = (E(α0(t)|FW0t )′,E(α1(t)|FW0t )′, . . . ,E(αK(t)|FW0t )′)
′
,
Φ(β, γ) = (ϕ0(β0, γ0), ϕ1(β1, γ1), . . . , ϕK(βK , γK))
′
, ρΠ0 := Π⊗ ρIn×n, ρΠ := Π⊗ ρIn×n,
F
1,Π
0 = Π⊗ F 10 , F 2,Π0 := Π⊗ F 20 , F 1,Π := Π⊗ F1, F 2,Π := Π⊗ F2,
γ =

γ0 0 . . . 0
γ1,0 γ1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
γK,0 0 . . . γK
 , B0 =

b0
b
...
b
 , D0 =

σ0 0 . . . 0
0 σ . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . σ
 ,
A =

A0 0 . . . 0
0 A1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . AK
 , B =

B0 0 . . . 0
0 B . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . B
 , R−1 =

R0 0 . . . 0
0 R1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . RK
 ,
Q =

Q0 0 . . . 0
Q(1− ρ) Q . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
Q(1− ρ) 0 . . . Q
 ,G =

G0 0 . . . 0
G(1 − ρ) G . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
G(1 − ρ) 0 . . . G
 ,FΠ1 =

F
1,Π
0
F 1,Π
...
F 1,Π
 ,FΠ2 =

F
2,Π
0
F 2,Π
...
F 2,Π
 ,
QΠ =

Q0ρ
Π
0
QρΠ
...
QρΠ
 , GΠ =

G0ρ
Π
0
GρΠ
...
GρΠ
 , H =

0
H
...
H
 , H(α) =

0 0 . . . 0
0 Hα0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Hα0
 ,
FΠ2 (E(α(t)|FW0t )) =

F
2,Π
0 E(α(t)|FW0t ) 0 . . . 0
0 F 2,ΠE(α(t)|FW0t ) . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . F 2,ΠE(α(t)|FW0t )
 ,
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C =

C0 0 . . . 0
0 C . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . C
 , C(α) =

C0α0 0 . . . 0
0 Cα . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Cα
 , C(γ) =

C ′0γ0
C ′γ1
...
C ′γK
 ,
D =

D0 0 . . . 0
0 D1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . DK
 , D(β, γ) =

D0ϕ0(β0, γ0) 0 . . . 0
0 D1ϕ1(β1, γ1) . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . DKϕK(βK , γK)
 .
Using above notations, the system (15)-(16) can be written as
dα =
(
Aα+ BΦ(β, γ) + FΠ1 E(α(t)|FW0t ) + B0
)
dt
+
(
C(α) + D(β, γ) + FΠ2
(
E(α(t)|FW0t )
)
+H(α) +D0
)
dW (t),
dβ =−
(
A′β −Qα+QΠE(α(t)|FW0t )) + C(γ)
)
dt+ γdW (t),
α(0) =X, β(T ) = −Gα(T ) +GΠE(α(T )|FW0T ).
(30)
Now let λ∗ be the largest eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix 12 (A + A
′). Recalling that the
projection operator is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1, then by comparing (30)
with (29), one can check that the coefficients of Assumption (H1) can be chosen as following
λ1 = λ2 = λ
∗, k0 = ‖A‖, k1 = ‖FΠ1 ‖, k2 = k3 = ‖R−1‖‖B‖(‖B‖ + ‖D‖),
k4 = ‖Q‖, k5 = ‖QΠ‖, k6 = ‖C‖, k27 = 4(‖C‖ + ‖H‖)2, k28 = 4‖FΠ2 ‖2,
k9 = k10 = ‖R−1‖‖D‖(‖B‖ + ‖D‖), k211 = 2‖G‖2, k212 = 2‖GΠ‖2.
Thus by applying Theorem 5.1, we obtain the following global wellposedness of (30).
Theorem 5.2 Suppose that
4λ∗ < −2‖FΠ1 ‖ − ‖C‖2 − 4(‖C‖+ ‖H‖)2 − 4‖FΠ2 ‖2,
then there exists a δ1 > 0, which depends on λ
∗, ‖FΠ1 ‖, ‖Q‖, ‖QΠ‖, ‖C‖, ‖H‖, ‖FΠ2 ‖, ‖G‖, ‖GΠ‖,
and is independent of T , such that when ‖R−1‖, ‖B‖, ‖D‖ ∈ [0, δ1), there exists a unique adapted
solution (α, β, γ) to consistency condition system (15)-(16).
Remark 5.3 Let λ∗
FΠ1
be the largest eigenvalue of 12(F
Π
1 +(F
Π
1 )
′). Noticing Remark 5.1, one can
check that (H1)− (i′) holds with k̂1 = λ∗FΠ1 . Thus, from Remark 5.2, we have that if
4λ∗ < −2λ∗
FΠ1
− ‖C‖2 − 4(‖C‖ + ‖H‖)2 − 4‖FΠ2 ‖2,
then there exists a δ1 > 0, which depends on λ
∗, λ∗
FΠ1
, ‖Q‖, ‖QΠ‖, ‖C‖, ‖H‖, ‖FΠ2 ‖, ‖G‖, ‖GΠ‖,
and is independent of T , such that when ‖R−1‖, ‖B‖, ‖D‖ ∈ [0, δ1), there exists a unique adapted
solution (α, β, γ) to consistency condition system (15)-(16).
6 ε-Nash Equilibrium for Problem (CC)
In Section 2, we characterized the decentralized strategies {u¯it, 0 ≤ i ≤ N} of Problem (CC)
through the auxiliary Problem (LCC) and consistency condition system. Now, we turn to
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verify the ε-Nash equilibrium of these decentralized strategies. Here, we proceed our verification
based on the assumptions of local time horizon case (Section 4). Note that it can also be verified
based on global horizon case (Section 5) without essential difficulties. For major agent A0 and
minor agent Ai, the decentralized states x˘0t and x˘it are given respectively by
dx˘0 =
[
A0x˘0+B0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0)+F
1
0 x˘
(N)+b0
]
dt+
[
C0x˘0+D0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0) + F
2
0 x˘
(N)+σ0
]
dW0(t),
dx˘i =
[
Aθi x˘i+Bϕθi(p¯i, q¯i)+F1x˘
(N)+b
]
dt+
[
Cx˘i+Dθiϕθi(p¯i, q¯i) + F2x˘
(N)+Hx˘0+σ
]
dWi(t),
x˘0(0) = x0, x˘i(0) = x,
(31)
where x˘(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x˘
i and the processes (p¯0, q¯0, p¯i, q¯i) are solved by
dx¯0 =
(
A0x¯0+B0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0)+F
1
0
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t )+b0
)
dt
+
(
C0x¯0 +D0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0)+F
2
0
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t )+σ0
)
dW0(t),
dp¯0 = −
(
A′p¯0 −Q0(x¯0 − ρ0
K∑
i=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t )) + C ′q¯0
)
dt+ q¯0dW0(t),
dx¯i =
(
Aθi x¯i+Bϕθi(p¯i, q¯i)+F1
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t )+b
)
dt
+
(
Cx¯i +Dθiϕθi(p¯i, q¯i)+F2
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t )+Hx¯0+σ
)
dWi(t),
dp¯i =−
(
A′θi p¯i−Q(x¯i−ρ
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t )−(1−ρ)x¯0)+C ′q¯i
)
dt+q¯idWi(t)+q¯i,0dW0(t),
x¯0(0) = x0, p¯0(T ) = −G0
(
x¯0(T )− ρ0
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(T )|FW0T )
)
,
x¯i(0) = x, p¯i(T ) = −G
(
x¯i(T )− ρ
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(T )|FW0T )− (1− ρ)x¯0(T )
)
.
(32)
Here we recall that
ϕ0(p, q) := PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0p+D
′
0q
)]
, ϕθi(p, q) := PΓθi
[
R−1θi
(
B′p+D′θiq
)]
,
and αk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K are given by (15) and (16). We mention that (32) gives also the dynamics of
the limiting state (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯N ) and one can check easily that (x¯0, p¯0, q¯0) = (α0, β0, γ0). Now,
we would like to show that for u¯0 = ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0) and u¯i = ϕθi(p¯i, q¯i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯N )
is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC). Let us first present following several lemmas.
Lemma 6.1 Under (A1)-(A4), there exists a constant M independent of N , such that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤M.
Proof From Theorem 4.1, we know that on a small time interval the system of fully coupled
FBSDE (15)-(16) has a unique solution (for the global case, see Theorem 5.2 and Remark 5.3)
(α0, β0, γ0) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn×3) and (αk, βk, γk, γk,0) ∈ L2Fk(0, T ;Rn×4), 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
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Then, the classical results on FBSDEs yields that (32) also has a unique solution
(x¯0, p¯0, q¯0) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn×3) and (x¯i, p¯i, q¯i, q¯i,0) ∈ L2F i(0, T ;Rn×4), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
(Indeed, FBSDEs (32) has a unique solution for arbitrary T by using the Theorem 2.1 of [21]
and the results of [22, 40]). Thus, SDEs system (31) has also a unique solution
(x˘0, x˘1 . . . , x˘N ) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn)× L2F (0, T ;Rn)× . . .× L2F (0, T ;Rn).
Moreover, since {Wi}Ni=1 is N -dimensional Brownian motion whose components are indepen-
dent identically distributed, we have that for the k-type minor agents, under the conditional
expectation E(·|FW0)), for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the processes (x¯i, p¯i, q¯i), i ∈ Ik, are indepen-
dent identically distributed. We also note that for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, x˘i, i ∈ Ik, are iden-
tically distributed. Noticing that (p¯0, q¯0) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn) × L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn), and (p¯i, q¯i) ∈
L2F i(0, T ;R
n)×L2F i(0, T ;Rn), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , then the Lipschitz property of the projection onto the
convex set yields that ϕθ0(p¯0, q¯0) := ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0) = PΓ0
(
R−10
(
BT p¯0 + D
T q¯0
)) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ; Γ0)
and ϕθi(p¯i, q¯i) := PΓθi
(
R−1θi
(
BT p¯i+D
T q¯i
)) ∈ L2F i(0, T ; Γθi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Moreover, there exists
a constant M independent of N which may very line by line in the following, such that for all
0 ≤ i ≤ N , 0 ≤ k ≤ K,
E sup
0≤t≤T
(|αk(t)|2 + |βk(t)|2 + |x¯i(t)|2 + |p¯i(t)|2)
+ E
∫ T
0
(|γk(t)|2 + |q¯i(t)|2 + |ϕθi(p¯i(t), q¯i(t))|2) ≤M.
(33)
From (31), by using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality, it follows that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘0(s)|2 ≤M +ME
∫ t
0
[
|x˘0(s)|2+|x˘(N)(s)|2
]
ds ≤M +ME
∫ t
0
[
|x˘0(s)|2+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2
]
ds,
and by Gronwall’s inequality, we obtain
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘0(s)|2 ≤M +ME
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2ds, (34)
Similarly, from (31) again, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤M +ME
∫ t
0
[
|x˘0(s)|2+|x˘i(s)|2+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2
]
ds.
Then using (34), we get
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤M +ME
∫ t
0
[
|x˘i(s)|2+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2
]
ds. (35)
Thus
E sup
0≤s≤t
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤ E
N∑
i=1
sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤MN + 2ME
∫ t
0
[ N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2
]
ds.
By Gronwall’s inequality, it is easy to obtain E sup
0≤t≤T
∑N
i=1 |x˘i(t)|2 = O(N), for any 1 ≤ i ≤
N . Then, substituting this estimate to (35) and using Gronwall’s inequality once again, we
have E sup0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ M, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N. By applying this estimate to (34), we get
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘0(t)∣∣∣2 ≤M. We complete the proof.
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Now, we recall that
x˘(N) =
1
N
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Ik
x˘i =
K∑
k=1
π
(N)
k
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
x˘i, and Φ(t) =
K∑
k=1
πkE(αk(t)|FW0t ),
then we have
Lemma 6.2 Under (A1)-(A4), there exists a constant M independent of N such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘(N)(t)−Φ(t)∣∣∣2 ≤M( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
, where εN = sup
1≤k≤K
|π(N)k − πk|.
Proof For each fixed 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we consider the k-type minor agents. We denote x˘(k) :=
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik x˘i. Let us add up Nk states of all k-type minor agents and then divide by Nk, we have
dx˘(k) =
Akx˘(k)+ B
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)+F
1x˘(N)+b0
 dt
+
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
[
Cx˘i+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2x˘
(N)+Hx˘0+σ0
]
dWi(t), x˘
(k)(0) = x.
(36)
Recall mk = E(αk(t)|FW0t ), and taking conditional expectation E(·|FW0t ) on the first equation
of (15) and noticing that E(ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)|FW0t ) = E(ϕk(βk, γk)|FW0t ), for any i ∈ Ik and αk(s) is
Fks -adapted, then we have
dmk =
(
Akmk+BE(ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)|FW0t )+F1Φ+b
)
dt, mk(0) = x. (37)
From (36) and (37), by denoting ∆k(t) := x˘
(k)(t)−mk(t), we have
d∆k =
[
Ak∆k+F1(x˘
(N)−Φ)+ B
Nk
(∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)−E(ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)|FW0t )
)]
dt
+
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
[
Cx˘i+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2x˘
(N)+Hx˘0+σ0
]
dWi(t), ∆(0) = 0.
The inequality (x+ y)2 ≤ 2x2 + 2y2 and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yield that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|∆k(s)|2 + |x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds
+ME
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk
∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− E(ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+
2
N2k
E sup
0≤r≤t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ r
0
∑
i∈Ik
[
Cx˘i+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2x˘
(N)+Hx˘0+σ0
]
dWi(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
From BDG inequality, we obtain
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|∆k(s)|2 + |x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds
+ME
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk ∑i∈Ik ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− E(ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+
M
N2k
E
∑
i∈Ik
∫ t
0
∣∣∣Cx˘i+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2(x˘(N) − Φ)+F2Φ+Hx˘0+σ0∣∣∣2 ds.
(38)
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Let us first focus on the second term of the right hand-side of (38). Since for each fixed
s ∈ [0, T ], under the conditional expectation E(·|FW0s )), for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the processes
(x¯i(s), p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik, are independent identically distributed, if we denote µ(s) = E(ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )),
then µ does not depend on i and moreover we have
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk
∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
N2k
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈Ik
[
ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− µ(s)
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
N2k
E
∑
i∈Ik
|ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s)|2+
∑
i,j∈Ik,j 6=i
〈ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s), ϕk(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))−µ(s)〉
 .
Since (p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik, are independent under E(·|FW0s )), we have
E
∑
i,j∈Ik,j 6=i
〈ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s), ϕk(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))−µ(s)〉
=E
 ∑
i,j∈Ik,j 6=i
E
(
〈ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s), ϕk(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))−µ(s)〉
∣∣∣FW0s )

=E
 ∑
i,j∈Ik,j 6=i
〈
E
(
ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s)
∣∣∣FW0s ) ,E(ϕk(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))−µ(s)∣∣∣FW0s )〉
 = 0.
Then, due to the fact that (p¯i, q¯i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are identically distributed, we obtain
E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk ∑i∈Ik ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− E(ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
=
1
N2k
∫ t
0
E
∑
i∈Ik
|ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s)|2 ds= 1
Nk
∫ t
0
E |ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))−µ(s)|2 ds≤ M
Nk
,
where the last equality due to (33). Now we focus on the third term of the right hand-side of
(38), using (33), Lemma 6.1 and that (x˘i(s), p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik, are identically distributed, it
follows
M
N2k
∑
i∈Ik
E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣Cx˘i+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2(x˘(N) − Φ)+F2Φ+Hx˘0+σ0∣∣∣2 ds
≤M
N2k
∑
i∈Ik
E
∫ t
0
(
|x˘i(s)|2+|ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)|2+|x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2+|Φ(s)|2+|x˘0(s)|2+|σ(s)|2
)
ds
≤M
Nk
E
∫ t
0
E|x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2ds+ M
Nk
.
Therefore, from above analysis, we get from (38) that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|∆k(s)|2 + |x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds+
M
Nk
,
and Gronwall’s inequality yields that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
|x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2ds+ M
Nk
. (39)
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Since
x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s) =
K∑
k=1
π(N)k 1Nk ∑i∈Ik x˘i(s)− πkE(αk(s)|FW0s )

=
K∑
k=1
π(N)k
 1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
x˘i(s)− E(αk(s)|FW0s )
 + (π(N)k − πk)E(αk(s)|FW0s )

=
K∑
k=1
π
(N)
k ∆k(s) +
K∑
k=1
(
π
(N)
k − πk
)
E(αk(s)|FW0s ),
by using (33),(39) and π
(N)
k =
Nk
N ≤ 1 we obtain that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2 ≤E
K∑
k=1
sup
0≤s≤t
π
(N)
k |∆k(s)|2 +Mε2N
≤ME
∫ t
0
|x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2ds+ M
N
+Mε2N .
Finally, by using Gronwall’s inequality, we complete the proof.
Lemma 6.3 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)− x¯i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤M( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
.
Proof On the one hand, from both the first equation of (31) and (32), we have d(x˘0 − x¯0) =
[
A0(x˘0 − x¯0)+F 10 (x˘(N)−Φ)
]
dt+
[
C0(x˘0 − x¯0)+F 20 (x˘(N)−Φ)
]
dWi(t),
x˘0(0)− x¯0(0) = 0.
The classical estimate for the SDE yields that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘0(t)− x¯0(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ME ∫ T
0
∣∣∣x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)∣∣∣2 ds,
where M is a constant independent of N . Noticing Lemma 6.2, we obtain
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘0(t)− x¯0(t)∣∣∣2 ≤M( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
. (40)
On the other hand, from the second equation of (31) and the third equation of (32), we have
that for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , d(x˘i − x¯i) =
[
Aθi(x˘i − x¯i)+F1(x˘(N)−Φ)
]
dt+
[
C(x˘i − x¯i)+F2(x˘(N)−Φ) +H(x˘0 − x¯0)
]
dWi(t),
x˘i(0) − x¯i(0) = 0.
The classical estimate for the SDE yields that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)− x¯i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ME ∫ T
0
(∣∣∣x˘(N)(s)− Φ(s)∣∣∣2 + |x˘0(s)− x¯0(s)|2) ds.
Noticing Lemma 6.2 and (40), we obtain E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)−x¯i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤M( 1N+ε2N). Thus, considering
also (40) we complete the proof.
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Lemma 6.4 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), for all 0 ≤ i ≤ N , we have∣∣∣Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− Ji(u¯i)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
+ εN
)
.
Proof Let us first consider the major agent. Recall (3), (6) and (17), we have
J0(u¯0, u¯−0)− J0(u¯0) = 1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
x˘0−ρ0x˘(N)
)
, x˘0−ρ0x˘(N)
〉
−
〈
Q0
(
x¯0−ρ0Φ
)
, x¯0−ρ0Φ
〉)
dt
+
〈
G0
(
x˘0(T )−ρ0x˘(N)(T )
)
, x˘0(T )−ρ0x˘(N)(T )
〉
−
〈
G0
(
x¯0(T )−ρ0Φ(T )
)
, x¯0(T )−ρ0Φ(T )
〉]
.
(41)
From (33), we have E sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯0(t)|2 ≤M and E sup
0≤t≤T
|αi(t)|2 ≤M , for any 0 ≤ i ≤ N . Noticing
that Φ(t) =
∑K
k=1 πkE(αk(t)|FW0t ), it is not hard to check that E sup
0≤t≤T
|Φ(t)|2 ≤M. Now, from
such estimates and Lemma 6.2, Lemma 6.3 as well as
〈Q0(a− b), a− b〉 − 〈Q0(c− d), c − d〉
=〈Q0(a− b− (c− d)), a − b− (c− d)〉+ 2〈Q0(a− b− (c− d)), c − d〉,
we have∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
x˘0−ρ0x˘(N)
)
, x˘0−ρ0x˘(N)
〉
−
〈
Q0
(
x¯0−ρ0Φ
)
, x¯0−ρ0Φ
〉)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
≤M
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘0 − ρ0x˘(N) − (x¯0 − ρ0Φ)∣∣∣2 dt+M ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘0 − ρ0x˘(N) − (x¯0 − ρ0Φ)∣∣∣ |x¯0 − ρ0Φ| dt
≤M
∫ T
0
E |x˘0 − x¯0|2 dt+M
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘(N) − Φ∣∣∣2 dt
+M
∫ T
0
(
E
∣∣∣x˘0 − ρ0x˘(N) − (x¯0 − ρ0Φ)∣∣∣2) 12 (E |x¯0 − ρ0Φ|2) 12 dt
≤M
∫ T
0
E |x˘0 − x¯0|2 dt+M
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘(N) − Φ∣∣∣2 dt+M ∫ T
0
(
E |x˘0 − x¯0|2 + E
∣∣∣x˘(N) − Φ∣∣∣2) 12 dt
=O
(
1√
N
+ εN
)
.
Similar argument allows us to show that∣∣∣∣E[〈G0(x˘0(T )−ρ0x˘(N)(T )), x˘0(T )−ρ0x˘(N)(T )〉−〈G0(x¯0(T )−ρ0Φ(T )), x¯0(T )−ρ0Φ(T )〉]∣∣∣∣
= O
(
1√
N
+ εN
)
.
Thus, the proof for the major agent is completed by noticing (41). Let us now focus on the
minor agents, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , recalling (4), (12) and (17), we have
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) =1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
x˘i − ρx˘(N) − (1− ρ)x˘0
)
, x˘i − ρx˘(N) − (1− ρ)x˘0
〉
+
〈
Rθi u¯i, u¯i
〉)
dt
+
〈
G
(
x˘i(T )−ρx˘(N)(T )−(1−ρ)x˘0(T )
)
, x˘i(T )−ρx˘(N)(T )−(1−ρ)x˘0(T )
〉]
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and
Ji(u¯i) =
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
x¯i − ρΦ− (1− ρ)x¯0
)
, x¯i − ρΦ− (1− ρ)x¯0
〉
dt+
〈
Rθi u¯i, u¯i
〉)
dt
+
〈
G
(
x¯i(T )− ρΦ(T )− (1− ρ)x¯0(T )
)
, x¯i(T )− ρΦ(T )− (1− ρ)x¯0(T )
〉]
.
From (33), we have E sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯i(t)|2 ≤ M . Using such estimate, E sup
0≤t≤T
|Φ(t)|2 ≤ M , Lemmas
6.2, 6.3, similar to the major agent, it follows that
∣∣∣Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− Ji(u¯i)∣∣∣ = O( 1√N + εN).
6.1 Major agent’s perturbation
In this subsection, we will prove that the control strategies set (u¯1, u¯2, . . . , u¯N ) is an ε-Nash
equilibrium of Problem (CC) for the major agent, i.e. ∃ ε = ε(N) ≥ 0, lim
N→∞
ε(N) = 0 s.t
J0(u¯0(·), u¯−0(·)) ≤ J0(u0(·), u¯−0(·)) + ε, for any u0 ∈ U0ad.
Let us consider that the major agent A0 uses an alternative strategy u0 and each minor
agent Ai uses the control u¯i = ϕθi(p¯i, q¯i), where (p¯i, q¯i) are solved from (32). Then the realized
state system with major agent’s perturbation is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
dy0 =
[
A0y0+B0u0+F
1
0 y
(N)+b0
]
dt+
[
C0y0+D0u0 + F
2
0 y
(N)+σ0
]
dW0(t),
dyi =
[
Aθiyi+Bϕθi(p¯i, q¯i)+F1y
(N)+b0
]
dt
+
[
Cyi+Dθiϕθi(p¯i, q¯i) + F2y
(N)+Hy0+σ0
]
dWi(t),
y0(0) = x0, yi(0) = x,
(42)
where y(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 yi. The well-posedness of above SDEs system is easy to obtain. To prove
(u¯0, u¯1, . . . , u¯N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the major agent, we need to show that for possible
alternative control u0, infu0∈U0ad J0(u0, u¯−0) ≥ J0(u¯0, u¯−0) − ε. Then we only need to consider
the perturbation u0 ∈ U0ad such that J0(u0, u¯−0) ≤ J0(u¯0, u¯−0). Thus, noticing Q0 ≥ 0 and
G0 ≥ 0, from Lemma 6.4, we have
E
∫ T
0
〈R0u0(t), u0(t)〉dt ≤ J0(u0, u¯−0) ≤ J0(u¯0, u¯−0) ≤ J0(u¯0) +O( 1√
N
+ εN ),
which implies that (noting (A4)), E
∫ T
0 |u0(t)|2dt ≤ M, where M is a constant independent of
N . Then similar to Lemma 6.1, we can show that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|yi(t)|2 ≤M. (43)
Lemma 6.5 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣y(N)(t)− Φ(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
.
26
Proof For each fixed 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we consider the k-type minor agents. We denote y(k) :=
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik yi. As there are Nk minor agents of the k-type, let us add up their states and then
divided by Nk, it follows that
dy(k) =
Aky(k)+ B
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)+F1y
(N)+b0
 dt
+
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
[
Cyi+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2y
(N)+Hy0+σ0
]
dWi(t), y
(k)(0) = x.
Recall (37) and if we denote ∆˜k(t) := y
(k)(t)−mk(t), it follows that
d∆˜k =
[
Ak∆˜k +
B
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)− E(ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)|FW0t )
+ F1(y(N) − Φ)
]
dt
+
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
[
Cyi+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2y
(N)+Hy0+σ0
]
dWi(t), ∆˜(0) = 0.
Similar to the argument in the proof of Lemma 6.2, we can show that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆˜k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|∆˜k(s)|2 + |y(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds
+ME
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk ∑i∈Ik ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− E(ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+
M
N2k
E
∑
i∈Ik
∫ t
0
∣∣∣Cyi+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2(y(N) − Φ)+F2Φ+Hy0+σ0∣∣∣2 ds,
(44)
and
E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk ∑i∈Ik ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))− E(ϕk(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds ≤ M
Nk
.
Using (33), (43) and the fact that (yi(s), p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik, are identically distributed, we have
M
N2k
∑
i∈Ik
E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣Cyi+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F 2(y(N) − Φ)+F2Φ+Hy0+σ0∣∣∣2 ds
=
M
Nk
E
∫ t
0
E|y(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2ds+ M
Nk
.
Therefore, we get from (44) that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆˜k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|∆˜k(s)|2 + |y(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds+
M
Nk
,
and Gronwall’s inequality yields that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆˜k(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|y(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.2 again, and using (A1), we have for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|y(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2 ≤E
K∑
k=1
sup
0≤s≤t
π
(N)
k |∆k(s)|2 +Mε2N
≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|y(N)(s)−Φ(s)|2
]
ds+
M
N
+Mε2N .
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Finally, Gronwall’s inequality allows us to complete the proof.
Now, we introduce the following system of the decentralized limiting state with the major’s
perturbation control, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
dy¯0 =
[
A0y¯0+B0u0+F
1
0Φ+b0
]
dt+
[
C0y¯0+D0u0 + F
2
0Φ+σ0
]
dW0(t)
dy¯i = [Aθi y¯i+Bϕθi(p¯i, q¯i)+F1Φ+b0] dt
+[Cy¯i+Dθiϕθi(p¯i, q¯i) + F2Φ+Hy¯0+σ0] dWi(t)
y¯0(0) = x0, y¯i(0) = x.
(45)
Lemma 6.6 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣yi(t)− y¯i(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
.
Proof From both the first equation of (42) and (45), we obtain d(y0 − y¯0) =
[
A(y0 − y¯0) + F 10 (y(N) − Φ)
]
dt+
[
C(y0 − y¯0) + F 20 (y(N) − Φ)
]
dW0(t),
y0(0)− y¯0(0) = 0.
With the help of classical estimates of SDE and Lemma 6.5, it is easy to obtain
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣y0(t)− y¯0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
. (46)
Now, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , from both the second equation of (42) and (45), we get
d(yi − y¯i) =
[
Aθi(yi − y¯i) + F1(y(N) − Φ)
]
dt
+
[
C(yi − y¯i) + F2(y(N) −Φ) +H(y0 − y¯0)
]
dWi(t), yi(0) − y¯i(0) = 0.
The classical estimates of SDE, Lemma 6.5 and (46) allow us to complete the proof.
Lemma 6.7 Under (A1)-(A4), for the major agent’s perturbation control u0, we have∣∣∣J0(u0, u¯−0)− J0(u0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
+ εN
)
.
Proof Recall (3), (6) and (17), we have
J0(u0, u¯−0)− J0(u0) = 1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
y0 − ρ0y(N)
)
, y0 − ρ0y(N)
〉
−
〈
Q0
(
y¯0 − ρ0Φ
)
, y¯0 − ρ0Φ
〉)
dt
+
〈
G0
(
y0(T )−ρ0y(N)(T )
)
, y0(T )−ρ0y(N)(T )
〉
−
〈
G0
(
y¯0(T )−ρ0Φ(T )
)
, y¯0(T )−ρ0Φ(T )
〉]
.
(47)
Similar to Lemma 6.4, by using Lemmas 6.5, 6.6 and E
(
|y¯0(t)|2 + |Φ(t)|2
)
≤M , we have∣∣∣∣∣E
∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
y0 − ρ0y(N)
)
, y0 − ρ0y(N)
〉
−
〈
Q0
(
y¯0 − ρ0Φ
)
, y¯0 − ρ0Φ
〉)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
≤M
∫ T
0
E |y0 − y¯0|2 dt+M
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣y(N) − Φ∣∣∣2 dt+M ∫ T
0
(
E |y0 − y¯0|2 + E
∣∣∣y(N) −Φ∣∣∣2) 12 dt
=O
( 1√
N
+ εN
)
,
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and ∣∣∣∣∣E
[〈
G0
(
y0(T )− ρ0y(N)(T )
)
, y0(T )− ρ0y(N)(T )
〉
−
〈
G0
(
y¯0(T )− ρ0Φ(T )
)
, y¯0(T )− ρ0Φ(T )
〉]∣∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N + εN
)
.
The proof is completed by noticing (47).
Theorem 6.1 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), then the strategies set (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯N )
is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC) for the major agent.
Proof Combining Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.7, we have
J0(u¯0, u¯−0)≤J0(u¯0)+O
( 1√
N
+εN
)
≤ J0(u0)+O
( 1√
N
+ εN
)
≤J0(u0, u¯−0)+O
( 1√
N
+εN
)
,
where the second inequality comes from the fact that J0(u¯0) = infu0∈U0ad J0(u0). Consequently,
Theorem 6.1 holds with ε = O
(
1√
N
+ εN
)
.
6.2 Minor agent’s perturbation
Now, let us consider the following case: a given minor agent Ai uses an alternative strategy
ui ∈ U iad, the major agent uses u¯0 = ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0) while other minor agents Aj use the control
u¯j = ϕθj (p¯j , q¯j), j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ N , where (p¯j , q¯j), 0 ≤ j ≤ N , j 6= i, are solved from (32). Then
the realized state system with the minor agent’s perturbation is, for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , j 6= i,
dl0 =
[
A0l0+B0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0)+F
1
0 l
(N)+b0
]
dt+
[
C0l0+D0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0) + F
2
0 l
(N)+σ0
]
dW0(t)
dli =
[
Aθili+Bui+F1l
(N)+b0
]
dt+
[
Cli+Dθiui + F2l
(N)+Hl0+σ0
]
dWi(t),
dlj =
[
Aθj lj+Bϕθj(p¯j, q¯j)+F1l
(N)+b0
]
dt+
[
Clj+Dθjϕθj (p¯j , q¯j) + F2l
(N)+Hl0+σ0
]
dWi(t),
l0(0) = x0, li(0) = lj(0) = x,
(48)
where l(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 l
i. The well-posedness of above SDEs system is easily to obtain. Similar
to the argument of major agent, to prove (u¯0, u¯1, . . . , u¯N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the minor
agent, noticing Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0, Rθi > 0 and Lemma 6.4, we only need to consider the perturbation
ui ∈ U iad satisfying
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt ≤M, (49)
where M is a constant independent of N . Similar to Lemma 6.1, we can show that
sup
0≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|li(t)|2 ≤M. (50)
We first present the following lemma
Lemma 6.8 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣l(N)(t)−Φ(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
.
29
Proof We know that for each fixed i, there exists a unique 1 ≤ k¯ ≤ K, such that i ∈ Ik¯. Let us
denote l(k) := 1Nk
∑
i∈Ik li, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. We first consider the k-type minor agents, where k 6= k¯.
Adding up their states and then divided by Nk, we have for k 6= k¯,
dl(k) =
Akl(k)+ B
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
ϕk(p¯i, q¯i)+F1l
(N)+b0
 dt
+
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
[
Cli+Dkϕk(p¯i, q¯i) + F2l
(N)+Hl0+σ0
]
dWi(t), l
(k)(0) = x.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.2, for mk = E(αk(t)|FW0t ), we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
|l(k)(s)−mk(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds +
M
Nk
. (51)
Now let us focus on the k¯-type minor agents, we have
dl(k¯) =
Ak¯l(k¯)+ BNk¯ ui+ BNk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j , q¯j)+F1l
(N)+b0
 dt
+
1
Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯
[
Clj + F2l
(N)+Hl0+σ0
]
dWj(t)
+
1
Nk¯
Dk¯uidWi(t)+
1
Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
Dk¯ϕk¯(p¯j, q¯j)dWj(t), l
(k¯)(0) = x.
Recalling (37) and if we denote Ξ := l(k¯) −mk¯, it follows that
dΞ =
[
AΞ+F1(l
(N) − Φ)+ 1
Nk¯
Bui+
B
Nk¯
 ∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j, q¯j)− E(ϕk¯(p¯i, q¯i)|FW0t )
]dt
+
1
Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯
[
Clj + F2l
(N)+Hl0+σ0
]
dWj(t),
+
1
Nk¯
Dk¯uidWi(t)+
1
Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
Dk¯ϕk¯(p¯j , q¯j)dWj(t), Π(0) = 0.
By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and BDG inequality, we obtain that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|Ξ(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
(
|Ξ(s)|2+ 1
N2
k¯
|ui(s)|2+|l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
)
ds
+ME
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j, q¯j)− E(ϕk¯(p¯i, q¯i)|FW0t )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2 ]
ds
+
M
N2
k¯
E
∑
j∈Ik¯
∫ t
0
∣∣∣F2(l(N)(s)− Φ(s))+F2Φ(s)+Clj(s)+Hl0(s)+σ(s)∣∣∣2 ds
+
M
N2
k¯
E
∫ t
0
|ui(s)|2ds+ M
N2
k¯
E
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
∫ t
0
|ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))|2ds.
(52)
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On the one hand, since for each fixed s ∈ [0, T ], under the conditional expectation E(·|FW0s ),
the processes (p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik¯, are independent identically distributed. If we denote µ(s) =
E(ϕk¯(p¯i(s), q¯i(s))|FW0s )), then µ does not depend on i. Moreover,
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤2E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))−
Nk¯ − 1
Nk¯
µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ 2E
∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯µ(s)
∣∣∣∣2
=2
(Nk¯ − 1)2
N2
k¯
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯ − 1
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
2
N2
k¯
E|µ(s)|2.
Then, due to (33) and the fact that (p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik¯, are independent identically distributed
under E(·|FW0s ), similar to the proof of Lemma 6.2, we can obtain
∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
≤2(Nk¯ − 1)
2
N2
k¯
∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nk¯ − 1
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds +
2
N2
k¯
∫ t
0
E|µ(s)|2ds
=2
Nk¯ − 1
N2
k¯
∫ t
0
E |ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))−µ(s)|2 ds+
2
N2
k¯
∫ t
0
E|µ(s)|2ds ≤ M
Nk¯
.
On the other hand, due to (49) and (50), we get
M
N2
k¯
E
∫ t
0
|ui(s)|2ds+ M
N2
k¯
E
N∑
j=1
∫ t
0
∣∣∣F2(l(N)(s)− Φ(s))+F2Φ(s)+Clj(s)+Hl0(s)+σ(s)∣∣∣2 ds
≤M
Nk¯
E
∫ t
0
|l(N)(s)−Φ(s)|2ds+M
Nk¯
.
Moreover, since (p¯i(s), q¯i(s)), i ∈ Ik¯, are identically distributed under E(·|FW0s ), we have
M
N2
k¯
E
∑
j∈Ik¯,j 6=i
∫ t
0 |ϕk¯(p¯j(s), q¯j(s))|2ds ≤ MNk¯ . Therefore, from above estimates, we get from (52)
that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤T
|Ξ(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
|Ξ(s)|2 + |l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds+
M
Nk¯
,
which yields, by using Gronwall’s inequality, that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|l(k¯)(s)−mk¯(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds +
M
Nk¯
. (53)
Consequently, noticing (51) and (53), we have for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
E sup
0≤s≤t
|l(k)(s)−mk(s)|2 ≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds +
M
Nk
. (54)
31
Since
l(N)(s)− Φ(s) =
K∑
k=1
π(N)k 1Nk ∑i∈Ik li(s)− πkE(αk(s)|FW0s )

=
K∑
k=1
π(N)k
 1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
li(s)− E(αk(s)|FW0s )
 + (π(N)k − πk)E(αk(s)|FW0s )

=
K∑
k=1
π
(N)
k (l
(k)(s)−mk(s)) +
K∑
k=1
(
π
(N)
k − πk
)
E(αk(s)|FW0s ),
then by (33), (54) and π
(N)
k =
Nk
N ≤ 1, we have for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2 ≤E
K∑
k=1
sup
0≤s≤t
π
(N)
k |l(k)(s)−mk(s)|2 +Mε2N
≤ME
∫ t
0
[
|l(N)(s)− Φ(s)|2
]
ds+
M
N
+Mε2N .
Finally, by using Gronwall’s inequality, we complete the proof.
Now, we introduce the following system of decentralized limiting state with the perturbation
strategy of minor agent Ai: for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , j 6= i,
dl¯0 =
[
A0l¯0+B0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0)+F
1
0Φ+b0
]
dt+
[
C0 l¯0+D0ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0) + F
2
0Φ+σ0
]
dW0(t)
dl¯i =
[
Aθi l¯i+Bui+F1Φ+b0
]
dt+
[
Cl¯i+Dθiui + F2Φ+Hl¯0+σ0
]
dWi(t),
dl¯j =
[
Aθj l¯j+Bϕθj (p¯j, q¯j)+F1Φ+b0
]
dt+
[
Cl¯j+Dθjϕθj (p¯j , q¯j) + F2Φ+Hl¯0+σ0
]
dWi(t),
l¯0(0) = x0, l¯i(0) = l¯j(0) = x.
(55)
Lemma 6.9 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
E sup
0≤t≤T
(∣∣∣l0(t)− l¯0(t)∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣li(t)− l¯i(t)∣∣∣2) = O( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
. (56)
Proof From both the first equation of (48) and (55), we obtain d(l0 − l¯0) =
[
A0(l0 − l¯0) + F 10 (l(N) − Φ)
]
dt+
[
C(l0 − l¯0) + F 20 (l(N) − Φ)
]
dW0(t),
l0(0)− l¯0(0) = 0.
With the help of classical estimates of SDE and Lemma 6.8, we have
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣l0(t)− l¯0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
+ ε2N
)
. (57)
Now, from both the second equation of (48) and (55), we obtain
d(li − l¯i) =
[
Aθi(li − l¯i) + F1(l(N) − Φ)
]
dt
+
[
C(li − l¯i) + F2(l(N) − Φ) +H(l0 − l¯0)
]
dW0(t), li(0) − l¯i(0) = 0.
From the classical estimates of SDE, Lemma 6.8 and (57), it is easy to obtain (56).
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Lemma 6.10 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , for the minor agent
Ai’s perturbation control ui, we have∣∣∣Ji(ui, u¯−i)− J0(ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
+ εN
)
.
Proof Recall (4), (12) and (17), we have
Ji(ui, u¯−i)− Ji(ui)
=
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
li − ρl(N)
)− (1− ρ)l0, li − ρl(N) − (1− ρ)l0〉
−
〈
Q
(
l¯i − ρΦ− (1− ρ)l¯0
)
, l¯i − ρΦ− (1− ρ)l¯0
〉)
dt
+
〈
G
(
li(T )− ρl(N)(T )− (1− ρ)l0(T )
)
, li(T )− ρl(N)(T )− (1− ρ)l0(T )
〉
−
〈
G
(
l¯i(T )− ρΦ(T )− (1− ρ)l¯0(T )
)
, l¯i(T )− ρΦ(T )− (1− ρ)l¯0(T )
〉]
.
(58)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.4, by using Lemma 6.8, 6.9 and E
(∣∣l¯0(t)∣∣2 + ∣∣l¯i(t)∣∣2 + |Φ(t)|2) ≤
M , we have∣∣∣∣∣E
∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
li − ρl(N) − (1− ρ)l0
)
, li − ρl(N) − (1− ρ)l0
〉
−
〈
Q
(
l¯i − ρΦ
)− (1− ρ)l¯0, l¯i − ρΦ− (1− ρ)l¯0〉)dt
∣∣∣∣∣
≤M
∫ T
0
E
∣∣li − l¯i∣∣2 dt+M ∫ T
0
E
∣∣l0 − l¯0∣∣2 dt+M ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣l(N) − Φ∣∣∣2 dt
+M
∫ T
0
(
E
∣∣li − l¯i∣∣2 + E ∣∣l0 − l¯0∣∣2 + E ∣∣∣l(N) − Φ∣∣∣2) 12 dt=O( 1√
N
+εN
)
and∣∣∣∣∣E
[〈
G
(
li(T )− ρl(N)(T )− (1− ρ)l0(T )
)
, li(T )− ρl(N)(T )− (1− ρ)l0(T )
〉
−
〈
G
(
l¯i(T )− ρΦ(T )− (1− ρ)l¯0(T )
)
, l¯i(T )− ρΦ(T )− (1− ρ)l¯0(T )
〉]∣∣∣∣∣=O( 1√N +εN
)
.
The proof is completed by noticing (58).
Theorem 6.2 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of Problem (CC) for minor agents.
Proof For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , combining Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.10, we have
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) ≤ Ji(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
+εN
)
≤ Ji(ui) +O
( 1√
N
+εN
)
≤ Ji(ui, u¯−i) +O
( 1√
N
+εN
)
,
where the second inequality comes from the fact that Ji(u¯i) = infui∈U iad Ji(ui). Consequently,
Theorem 6.2 holds with ε = O
(
1√
N
+ εN
)
.
By combining Theorems 6.1, 6.2, we obtain the following main result of this paper:
Theorem 6.3 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of Problem (CC), where u¯0 = ϕ0(p¯0, q¯0), u¯i = ϕθi(p¯i, q¯i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N for
ϕ0(p, q) := PΓ0
[
R−10
(
B′0p+D
′
0q
)]
, ϕθi(p, q) := PΓθi
[
R−1θi
(
B′p+D′θiq
)]
.
33
7 Appendix
We give this appendix to prove Theorem 5.1. The fully-coupled structure of MF-FBSDE (29)
arises difficulties for establishing its wellposedness. Motivated by Pardoux and Tang [39] The-
orem 3.1, we can establish the wellposedness of MF-FBSDE (29) for arbitrary time duration
when it is weakly coupled.
Let us first note that for a given (Y (·), Z(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rm) × L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1)), the
forward equation in the MF-FBSDE (29) has a unique solution X(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn), thus we
introduce a map M1 : L2F (0, T ;Rm)× L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1))→ L2F (0, T ;Rn), through
X(t) = x+
∫ t
0
b(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s)])ds
+
∫ t
0
σ(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s))dW (s).
(59)
We mention that the wellposedness of (59) can be established by using the contraction mapping
method under assumption (H1), (H2), although it has the term E[Xs|FW0s ]. We omit the proof.
Moreover, with the help of BDG inequality, it follows that E supt∈[0,T ] |X(t)|2 <∞.
Lemma 7.1 Let Xi be the solution of (59) corresponding to (Yi(·), Zi(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rm) ×
L2F (0, T ;R
m×(d+1)), i = 1, 2. Then for all λ ∈ R, K1, K2 > 0, we have
e−λtE|X1(t)−X2(t)|2 + λ1
∫ t
0
e−λsE|X1(s)−X2(s)|2ds
≤ (k2K1 + k29)
∫ t
0
e−λsE|Y1(s)− Y2(s)|2ds + (k3K2 + k210)
∫ t
0
e−λsE|Z1(s)− Z2(s)|2ds,
(60)
where λ1 := λ− 2λ1 − k2K−11 − k3K−12 − 2k1 − k27 − k28. Moreover,
e−λtE|X1(t)−X2(t)|2 ≤ (k2K1 + k29)
∫ t
0
e−λ1(t−s)e−λsE|Y1(s)− Y2(s)|2ds
+(k3K2 + k
2
10)
∫ t
0
e−λ1(t−s)e−λsE|Z1(s)− Z2(s)|2ds.
(61)
Proof We denote X := X1 −X2, Y := Y1 − Y2, Z := Z1 − Z2, b := b(X1,E[X1|FW0 ], Y1, Z1)−
b(X2,E[X2|FW0 ], Y2, Z2), σ := σ(X1,E[X1|FW0 ], Y1, Z1) − σ(X2,E[X2|FW0 ], Y2, Z2). Applying
Itoˆ’s formula to e−λtE|X1(t)−X2(t)|2 and taking expectation, we obtain
e−λtE|X(t)|2 = −λ
∫ t
0
e−λsE|X(s)|2ds + 2E
∫ t
0
e−λs〈X(s), b(s)〉ds + E
∫ t
0
e−λs|σ(s)|2ds. (62)
Noticing that
2〈X(s), b(s)〉
= 2〈X(s), b(s,X1(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y1(s), Z1(s))− b(X2(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y1(s), Z1(s))〉
+2〈X(s), b(s,X2(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y1(s), Z1(s))− b(X2(s),E[X2(s)|FW0s ], Y2(s), Z2(s))〉
≤ 2λ1|X(s)|2 + 2|X(s)|(k1|E[X(s)|FW0s ]|+ k2|Y (s)|+ k3|Z(s)|)
≤ (2λ1 + k2K−11 + k3K−12 )|X(s)|2 + 2k1E[|X(s)|2|FW0s ]|+ k2K1|Y (s)|2 + k3K2|Z(s)|2,
and
|σ(s)|2 ≤ k27 |X(s)|2 + k28|E[X(s)|FW0s ]|2 + k29 |Y (s)|2 + k210|Z(s)|2
≤ k27 |X(s)|2 + k28E[|X(s)|2|FW0s ] + k29 |Y (s)|2 + k210|Z(s)|2.
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Then, from (62) and E
[
E[|X(s)|2|FW0s ]
]
= E|X(s)|2, we can obtain (60).
Now, we apply Itoˆ’s formula to e−λ1(t−s)e−λsE|X1(s) − X2(s)|2 for s ∈ [0, t] and taking
expectation, it follows that
e−λtE|X(t)|2 = −(λ− λ1)
∫ t
0
e−λ1(t−s)e−λsE|X(s)|2ds+ 2E
∫ t
0
e−λ1(t−s)e−λs〈X(s), b(s)〉ds
+E
∫ t
0
e−λ1(t−s)e−λs|σ(s)|2ds.
(63)
From above estimates and (63), one can prove (61).
Remark 7.1 By integrating both sides of (61) on [0, T ] and using 1−e
−λ1(T−s)
λ1
≤ 1−e−λ1T
λ1
, ∀s ∈
[0, T ], we have
‖X1 −X2‖2λ ≤
1− e−λ1T
λ1
[
(k2K1 + k
2
9)‖Y1 − Y2‖2λ + (k3K2 + k210)‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ
]
. (64)
Let t = T in (61) and noticing that e−λ1(T−s) ≤ 1 ∨ e−λ1T , ∀s ∈ [0, T ], thus
e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 ≤
[
1 ∨ e−λ1T
] [
(k2K1 + k
2
9)‖Y1 − Y2‖2λ + (k3K2 + k210)‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ
]
.
(65)
In particular, if λ1 > 0, we have
e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 ≤ (k2K1 + k29)‖Y1 − Y2‖2λ + (k3K2 + k210)‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ. (66)
Similarly, for a given X(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn), the backward equation in the MF-FBSDE (29)
has a unique solution (Y (·), Z(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rm) × L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1)), thus we can introduce
another map M2 : L2F (0, T ;Rn)→ L2F (0, T ;Rm)× L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1)), through
Y (t) = g(X(T ),E[X(T )|FW0T ]) +
∫ T
t
f(s,X(s),E[X(s)|FW0s ], Y (s), Z(s)])ds −
∫ T
t
Z(s)dW (s).
(67)
The wellposedness of (67) under assumption (H1), (H2) is referred to Darling and Pardoux [16]
Theorem 3.4 or Buckdahn and Nie [12] Lemma 2.2. Moreover, we have E supt∈[0,T ] |Y (t)|2 <∞.
Lemma 7.2 Let (Yi(·), Zi(·)) be the solution of (67) corresponding to Xi ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn), i =
1, 2. Then for all λ ∈ R, K3, K4 > 0, we have
e−λtE|Y1(t)− Y2(t)|2 + λ2
∫ T
t
e−λsE|Y1(s)− Y2(s)|2ds
+(1− k6K4)
∫ T
t
e−λsE|Z1(s)− Z2(s)|2ds
≤ (k211 + k212)e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 + (k4 + k5)K3
∫ T
t
e−λsE|X1(s)−X2(s)|2ds,
(68)
where λ2 := −λ− 2λ2 − (k4 + k5)K−13 − k6K−14 . Moreover,
e−λtE|Y1(t)− Y2(t)|2 + (1− k6K4)
∫ T
t
e−λ2(s−t)e−λsE|Z1(s)− Z2(s)|2ds
≤ (k211 + k212)e−λ2(T−t)e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2
+(k4 + k5)K3
∫ T
t
e−λ2(s−t)e−λsE|X1(s)−X2(s)|2ds.
(69)
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Proof We denote X := X1 −X2, Y := Y1 − Y2, Z := Z1 −Z2, f := f(X1,E[X1|FW0 ], Y1, Z1)−
f(X2,E[X2|FW0 ], Y2, Z2). Applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−λtE|Y1(t)−Y2(t)|2 and taking expectation,
we obtain
e−λtE|Y (t)|2 − λ
∫ T
t
e−λsE|Y (s)|2ds+ E
∫ T
t
e−λs|Z(s)|2ds
= e−λTE|Y (T )|2 + 2E
∫ T
t
e−λs〈Y (s), f(s)〉ds.
(70)
Noticing that
2〈Y (s), f(s)〉
= 2〈Y (s), f(s,X1(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y1(s), Z1(s))− f(X1(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y2(s), Z1(s))〉
+2〈Y (s), f(s,X1(s),E[X1(s)|FW0s ], Y2(s), Z1(s))− f(X2(s),E[X2(s)|FW0s ], Y2(s), Z2(s))〉
≤ 2λ2|Y (s)|2 + 2|Y (s)|(k4|X(s)|+ k5|E[X(s)|FW0s ]|+ k6|Z(s)|)
≤ (2λ2 + k4K−13 + k5K−13 + k6K−14 )|Y (s)|2 + k4K3|X(s)|2 + k5K3E[|X(s)|2|FW0s ]|+ k6K4|Z(s)|2,
and
|Y (T )|2 = |g(X1(T ),E[X1(T )|FW0T ])− g(X2(T ),E[X2(T )|FW0T ])|2
≤ k211|X(T )|2 + k212E[|X(s)|2|FW0s ].
Then, from (70) and E
[
E[|X(s)|2|FW0s ]
]
= E|X(s)|2, we can obtain (68).
Now, we apply Itoˆ’s formula to e−λ2(s−t)e−λsE|Y1(s) − Y2(s)|2 for s ∈ [t, T ] and taking
expectation, it follows that
e−λtE|Y (t)|2 − (λ+ λ2)
∫ T
t
e−λ2(s−t)e−λsE|Y (s)|2ds+ E
∫ T
t
e−λ2(s−t)e−λs|Z(s)|2ds
= e−λ2(T−t)e−λTE|Y (s)|2 + 2E
∫ T
t
e−λ2(s−t)e−λs〈Y (s), f(s)〉ds.
(71)
From above estimates and (71), one can prove (69).
Remark 7.2 Now we choose K4 satisfying 0 < K4 ≤ k−16 , then by integrating both sides of (69)
on [0, T ] and using 1−e
−λ2s
λ2
≤ 1−e−λ2T
λ2
, ∀s ∈ [0, T ], we have
‖Y1−Y2‖2λ ≤
1− e−λ2T
λ2
[
(k211 + k
2
12)e
−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 + (k4 + k5)K3‖X1 −X2‖2λ
]
. (72)
Let t = 0 in (69) and noticing that 1 ∧ e−λ2T ≤ e−λ2s ≤ 1 ∨ e−λ2T , ∀s ∈ [0, T ], thus
‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ ≤
(k211+k
2
12)e
−λ2T e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2+(k4+k5)K3(1 ∨ e−λ2T )‖X1−X2‖2λ
(1− k6K4)(1 ∧ e−λ2T )
.
(73)
On the other hand, if λ2 > 0, let t = 0 in (68), we have
‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ ≤
(k211 + k
2
12)e
−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 + (k4 + k5)K3‖X1 −X2‖2λ
1− k6K4 . (74)
Now, we present the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 We define M :=M2 ◦M1, recalling that M1 is defined through (59)
andM2 is defined through (67). ThusM maps L2F (0, T ;Rm)×L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1)) into itself. To
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prove the theorem, it is only need to show thatM is a contraction mapping for some equivalent
norm ‖ · ‖λ. In fact, for (Yi, Zi) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rm)× L2F (0, T ;Rm×(d+1)), let Xi :=M1(Yi, Zi) and
(Y i, Zi) :=M((Yi, Zi)), from (64), (65), (72) and (73) based on Lemma 7.1, 7.2, we have
‖Y 1 − Y 2‖2λ + ‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ
≤
[
1−e−λ2T
λ2
+ 1∨e
−λ2T
(1−k6K4)(1∧e−λ2T )
]
× [(k211 + k212)e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 + (k4 + k5)K3‖X1 −X2‖2λ]
≤
[
1−e−λ2T
λ2
+ 1∨e
−λ2T
(1−k6K4)(1∧e−λ2T )
]
×
[
(k211 + k
2
12)(1 ∨ e−λ1T ) + (k4 + k5)K3 1−e
−λ1T
λ1
]
× [(k2K1 + k29)‖Y1 − Y2‖2λ + (k3K2 + k210)‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ] .
Recalling that λ1 := λ − 2λ1 − k2K−11 − k3K−12 − 2k1 − k27 − k28 and λ2 := −λ − 2λ2 − (k4 +
k5)K
−1
3 − k6K−14 . Then by choosing suitable λ (e.g. we can easily choose λ big enough such
that λ1 ≥ 1 and λ2 ≤ 0), the first assertion is immediate.
Now let us prove the second assertion. Since 2(λ1+λ2) < −2k1−k26−k27−k28, we can choose
λ ∈ R, 0 < K4 ≤ k−16 and sufficient large K1,K2,K3 such that
λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, 1−K4k6 > 0.
Then from (64), (66), (72) and (74),we have
‖Y 1 − Y 2‖2λ + ‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ
≤
[
1
λ2
+ 11−k6K4
]
× [(k211 + k212)e−λTE|X1(T )−X2(T )|2 + (k4 + k5)K3‖X1 −X2‖2λ]
≤
[
1
λ2
+ 11−k6K4
]
×
[
k211 + k
2
12 + (k4 + k5)K3
1
λ1
]
× [(k2K1 + k29)‖Y1 − Y2‖2λ + (k3K2 + k210)‖Z1 − Z2‖2λ] .
This completes the second assertion.
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